Showing posts with label Macro. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Macro. Show all posts

Monday, August 26, 2013

Macro-prudential policy

Source: Wall Street Journal
Not a fan. A Wall Street Journal Op-Ed. Link to WSJ. Link to pdf on my website. Director's cut follows:

Interest rates make the headlines, but the Federal Reserve's most important role is going to be the gargantuan systemic financial regulator. The really big question is whether and how the Fed will pursue a "macroprudential" policy. This is the emerging notion that central banks should intensively monitor the whole financial system and actively intervene in a broad range of markets toward a wide range of goals including financial and economic stability.

For example, the Fed is urged to spot developing "bubbles," "speculative excesses" and "overheated" markets, and then stop them—as Fed Governor Sarah Bloom Raskin explained in a speech last month, by "restraining financial institutions from excessively extending credit." How? "Some of the significant regulatory tools for addressing asset bubbles—both those in widespread use and those on the frontier of regulatory thought—are capital regulation, liquidity regulation, regulation of margins and haircuts in securities funding transactions, and restrictions on credit underwriting."

This is not traditional regulation—stable, predictable rules that financial institutions live by to reduce the chance and severity of financial crises. It is active, discretionary micromanagement of the whole financial system. A firm's managers may follow all the rules but still be told how to conduct their business, whenever the Fed thinks the firm's customers are contributing to booms or busts the Fed disapproves of.

Macroprudential policy explicitly mixes the Fed's macroeconomic and financial stability roles. Interest-rate policy will be used to manipulate a broad array of asset prices, and financial regulation will be used to stimulate or cool the economy.

Foreign central banks are at it already, and a growing consensus among international policy types has left the Fed's relatively muted discussions behind. The sweeping agenda laid out in "Macroprudential Policy: An Organizing Framework," a March 2011 International Monetary Fund paper, is a case in point.

"The monitoring of systemic risks by macroprudential policy should be comprehensive," the IMF paper explains. "It should cover all potential sources of such risk no matter where they reside." Chillingly, policy "should be able to encompass all important providers of credit, liquidity, and maturity transformation regardless of their legal form, as well as individual systemically important institutions and financial market infrastructures."

What could possibly go wrong?

It's easy enough to point out that central banks don't have a great track record of diagnosing what they later considered "bubbles" and "systemic" risks. The Fed didn't act on the tech bubble of the 1990s or the real-estate bubble of the last decade. European bank regulators didn't notice that sovereign debts might pose a problem. Also, during the housing boom, regulators pressured banks to lend in depressed areas and to less creditworthy customers. That didn't pan out so well.

More deeply, the hard-won lessons of monetary policy apply with even greater force to the "macroprudential" project.

First lesson: Humility. Fine-tuning a poorly understood system goes quickly awry. The science of "bubble" management is, so far, imaginary.

Consider the idea that low interest rates spark asset-price "bubbles." Standard economics denies this connection; the level of interest rates and risk premiums are separate phenomena. Historically, risk premiums have been high in recessions, when interest rates have been low.

One needs to imagine a litany of "frictions," induced by institutional imperfections or current regulations, to connect the two. Fed Governor Jeremy Stein gave a thoughtful speech in February about how such frictions might work, but admitting our lack of real knowledge deeper than academic cocktail-party speculation.

Based on this much understanding, is the Fed ready to manage bubbles by varying interest rates? Mr. Stein thinks so, arguing that "in an environment of significant uncertainty . . . standards of evidence should be calibrated accordingly," i.e., down. The Fed, he says, "should not wait for "decisive proof of market overheating." He wants "greater overlap in the goals of monetary policy and regulation." The history of fine-tuning disagrees. And once the Fed understands market imperfections, perhaps it should work to remove them, not exploit them for price manipulation.

Second lesson: Follow rules. Monetary policy works a lot better when it is transparent, predictable and keeps to well-established traditions and limitations, than if the Fed shoots from the hip following the passions of the day. The economy does not react mechanically to policy but feeds on expectations and moral hazards. The Fed sneezed that bond buying might not last forever and markets swooned. As it comes to examine every market and targets every single asset price, the Fed can induce wild instability as markets guess the next anti-bubble decree.

Third lesson: Limited power is the price of political independence. Once the Fed manipulates prices and credit flows throughout the financial system, it will be whipsawed by interest groups and their representatives.

How will home builders react if the Fed decides their investments are bubbly and restricts their credit? How will bankers who followed all the rules feel when the Fed decrees their actions a "systemic" threat? How will financial entrepreneurs in the shadow banking system, peer-to-peer lending innovators, etc., feel when the Fed quashes their efforts to compete with banks?

Will not all of these people call their lobbyists, congressmen and administration contacts, and demand change? Will not people who profit from Fed interventions do the same? Willy-nilly financial dirigisme will inevitably lead to politicization, cronyism, a sclerotic, uncompetitive financial system and political oversight. Meanwhile, increasing moral hazard and a greater conflagration are sure to follow when the Fed misdiagnoses the next crisis.

The U.S. experienced a financial crisis just a few years ago. Doesn't the country need the Fed to stop another one? Yes, but not this way. Instead, we need a robust financial system that can tolerate "bubbles" without causing "systemic" crises. Sharply limiting run-prone, short-term debt is a much easier project than defining, diagnosing and stopping "bubbles." [For more, see this previous post] That project is a hopeless quest, dripping with the unanticipated consequences of all grandiose planning schemes.

In the current debate over who will be the next Fed chair, we should not look for a soothsayer who will clairvoyantly spot trouble brewing, and then direct the tiniest details of financial flows. Rather, we need a human who can foresee the future no better than you and I, who will build a robust financial system as a regulator with predictable and limited powers.

*****
Bonus extras. A few of many delicious paragraphs cut for space.

Do not count on the Fed to voluntarily limit its bubble-popping, crisis management, or regulator discretion. Vast new powers come at an institutionally convenient moment. It’s increasingly obvious how powerless conventional monetary policy is. Four and a half percent of the population stopped working between 2008 and 2010, and the ratio has not budged since. GDP fell seven and a half percent below “potential,” in 2009 and is still six points below. Two trillion didn’t dent the thing, and surely another two wouldn’t make a difference either. How delicious, in the name of “systemic stability,” to just step in and tell the darn banks what to do, and be important again!

Ben Bernanke on macroprudential policy:
For example, a traditional microprudential examination might find that an individual financial institution is relying heavily on short-term wholesale funding, which may or may not induce a supervisory response. The implications of that finding for the stability of the broader system, however, cannot be determined without knowing what is happening outside that particular firm. Are other, similar financial firms also highly reliant on short-term funding? If so, are the sources of short-term funding heavily concentrated? Is the market for short-term funding likely to be stable in a period of high uncertainty, or is it vulnerable to runs? If short-term funding were suddenly to become unavailable, how would the borrowing firms react--for example, would they be forced into a fire sale of assets, which itself could be destabilizing, or would they cease to provide funding or critical services for other financial actors? Finally, what implications would these developments have for the broader economy? ...
As if in our lifetimes anyone will have precise answers to questions like these. In case you didn't get the warning,
... And the remedies that might emerge from such an analysis could well be more far-reaching and more structural in nature than simply requiring a few firms to modify their funding patterns.
A big thank you to my editor at WSJ, Howard Dickman, who did more than the usual pruning of prose and asking tough questions.

Saturday, May 18, 2013

The Role of Monetary Policy, Revisited

I am giving a talk Thursday May 30, titled  "The Role of Monetary Policy, Revisited."  The event is at Booth's Gleacher Center in downtown Chicago, reception 4:30 and talk 5:15. It's part of a series of talks sponsored by the Becker-Friedman Institute.

The talk is based on  an essay I'm working on, and will be presenting at a few central banks this summer. Once per generation we re-think what central banks do, can't do, should do, and shouldn't do. Milton Friedman's famous 1968 address marked the last big transition. I think, we are in a similar moment. I will look at the big picture in the same spirit. I'm aiming at a serious talk, grounded in academic research, but accessible.

Blog followers, students, colleagues, friends, and even glider pilots are most welcome. Please rsvp so they know how many people to plan for.

The event announcement invitation and rsvp links are here on the BFI webpage

There is also an event announcement and rsvp link on the Booth Alumni events webpage here.




Problems viewing this e-mail? View it in a browser.
Becker Friedman Institute
The Becker Friedman Institute for Research in Economics of the University of Chicago cordially invites you to
The Role of Monetary Policy Revisited
A talk by John H. Cochrane, AQR Capital Management Distinguished Service Professor of Finance at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business
Thursday, May 30, 2013
4:30 p.m. Reception
5:15 p.m. Talk and Q&A
Executive Dining Room, Sixth Floor
University of Chicago Gleacher Center
450 North Cityfront Plaza Drive
Chicago, Illinois (map and directions)
Please join us as University of Chicago Booth School of Business Professor John Cochrane reexamines Milton Friedman's 1968 presidential address to the American Economic Association. In this famous speech on the role of monetary policy, Friedman argued, "There is always a temporary trade-off between inflation and unemployment; there is no permanent trade-off."
Starting from this perspective, Cochrane will reevaluate the role of monetary policy 45 years later. Is it effective? Can it fill all the roles people expect of it? How should monetary policy be conducted going forward?
RSVP
Please respond online by
May 23.
Please extend this invitation to others who might find the program of particular interest.
Complimentary valet parking will be available at the Gleacher Center entrance.
QUESTIONS
If you have questions or require advance assistance, please contact Maria Bardo-Colon at 773.834.1898 or bfi@uchicago.edu.
John H. Cochrane
The AQR Capital Management distinguished service professor of finance at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business, Cochrane's scholarly work focuses on finance, monetary economics, macroeconomics, health insurance, time-series econometrics, and other topics. He is the author of
Asset Pricing, a coauthor of The Squam Lake Report, a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research, a senior fellow of the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, and an adjunct scholar of the CATO Institute. He blogs as The Grumpy Economist. Cochrane earned a bachelor's degree in physics at Massachusetts Institute of Technology and PhD in economics at the University of California, Berkeley. He was a member of the University of Chicago Department of Economics before joining Chicago Booth.

Sunday, April 14, 2013

What the IMF consideres macro

Via Greg Mankiw's blog, I learned about the IMF conference on "Rethinking Macro Policy." See the announcement and program here. I reproduce the program below.

I find this most striking as a reflection on what the IMF considers "macro." Yes, they have the whole spectrum, indeed, all the way from  Geroge Akerlof and Joe Stiglitz on the far left end of traditional Keynesian economics, to... Olivier Blanchard and David Romer on the pretty-far left end of somewhat new-Keynesian economics?


Don't get me wrong, these are all very smart people, in the whole program and the final panel. Akerlof was one of my thesis advisers, and a lot of what I learned from him sticks with me today. But really, this is the entire spectrum of macro? Has anyone heard of, oh, Lucas, Sargent, Sims, Prescott and all their many descendants?  Especially if the project is to "rethink," would not some slight broadening of a spectrum have made sense?

It is a sharp lesson in the range of ideas that the IMF will bring to anything they do.


Program

IMF Headquarters 2
Conference Hall 1
Tuesday, April 16, 2013 

2:00–2:45pmRegistration
2:45–3:00pmOpening remarks: Christine Lagarde
3:00–4:30pmSESSION I: Monetary Policy 
Chair
Janet Yellen

Discussants

Lorenzo Bini-Smaghi
Mervyn King
Mike Woodford
4:30–5:00pmCoffee break
5:00–6:30pmSESSION II: Macroprudential Policies 
Chair
Andy Haldane

Discussants

Claudio Borio
Stanley Fischer
Choongsoo Kim

IMF Headquarters 2
Conference Hall 1
Wednesday, April 17, 2013

8:15–9:00amRegistration/Continental Breakfast
9:00–10:30amSESSION III: Financial Regulation
Chair
Sheila Bair

Discussants

Jeremy Stein
Jean Tirole
John Vickers
10:30–11:00amCoffee Break
11:00–12:30pmSESSION IV: Fiscal Policy
Chair
Janice Eberly

Discussants

Anders Borg
Roberto Perotti
Nouriel Roubini
2:00–3:30pmSESSION V: Exchange Rate Arrangements 
Chair
Agustín Carstens

Discussants

Jay Shambaugh
Martin Wolf
Gang Yi
3:30–4:00pm***Coffee Break***
4:00–5:30pmSESSION VI: Capital Account Management
Chair
Duvvuri Subbarao

Discussants

Philipp Hildebrand
Márcio Holland de Brito
Hélène Rey
5:30–6:30pmPANEL DISCUSSION 
George Akerlof
Olivier Blanchard
David Romer
Joseph Stiglitz
6:30–8:30pm***Cocktail Reception ***
(Venue: HQ2 Second Floor)

Sunday, March 3, 2013

Monetary policy with large debts

This is a Wall Street Journal Op-Ed, March 4 2013. They titled it "Treasury needs a better long game," but the most important question is whether the Fed can keep any independence, if 5% interest rates will cause $900 billion interest costs. There is a pdf version of the oped on my webpage. 


Sooner or later, the Federal Reserve will want to raise interest rates. Maybe next year. Maybe when unemployment declines below 6.5%. Maybe when inflation creeps up to 3%. But it will happen.

Can the Fed tighten without shedding much of the record $3 trillion of Treasury bonds and mortgage-backed securities on its balance sheet, and soaking up $2 trillion of excess reserves? Yes. The Fed can easily raise short-term interest rates by changing the rate it pays banks on reserves and the discount rate at which it lends.

But this comforting thought leaves out a vital consideration: Monetary policy depends on fiscal policy in an era of large debts and deficits. Suppose that the Fed raises interest rates to 5% over the next few years. This is a reversion to normal, not a big tightening. Yet with $18 trillion of debt outstanding, the federal government will have to pay $900 billion more in annual interest.

Will Congress and the public really agree to spend $900 billion a year for monetary tightening? Or will Congress simply command the Fed to keep down interest payments, as it did after World War II, reasoning that "Fed independence" isn't worth that huge sum of money?


This additional expenditure would double the deficit, which tempts a tipping point. Bond markets can accept fairly big temporary deficits without charging higher interest rates—buyers understand that bigger deficits for a few years can be made up by slightly larger tax revenues or spending cuts over decades to follow. But once markets sense that deficits may be unsustainable, and that bond buyers may face default, restructuring or inflation, they will demand still-higher interest rates. Higher rates mean higher deficits—leading to a fiscal death spiral.

Many economists think the tipping point starts when total government debt (federal, state and local) exceeds 90% of GDP. We are past that value, with large state and local debts, continuing sclerotic growth and a looming entitlements crisis to boot. This, not the "balance sheet" or other monetary or institutional constraints, will be the Fed's quandary—can the monetary authority really dare to risk a fiscal crisis?

The obvious answer is to fix the long-run deficit problem, with the reform of runaway spending, entitlement programs and a pro-growth tax policy. So far that is not happening.

Still, the Fed and the Treasury can buy a lot of time by lengthening the maturity of U.S. debt. Suppose all U.S. debt were converted to 30-year bonds. Then, if interest rates rose, Treasury would pay no more on its outstanding debt for 30 years. And if the country couldn't solve its fiscal problems by that time, it would deserve a Greek crisis.

Maturity structure of US debt.
Alas, the maturity structure of U.S. debt is quite short. I estimate that our government rolls over 40% of its debt every year, and 65% within three years. (I account for Federal Reserve holdings, coupon payments and use market values.) Thus the fiscal impact of higher interest rates will come quickly.

Mr. and Mrs. Smith shopping for a mortgage understand this trade-off. Mr. Smith: "Let's get the adjustable rate, we only have to pay 1%." Mrs. Smith: "No, honey, that is just the teaser rate. If we get the 30-year fixed at 3%, then we won't get kicked out of the house if rates go up."

Amazingly, nobody in the federal government is thinking about this trade-off. Instead, each agency thinks only for itself.

The Fed is still buying long-term bonds in an effort to temporarily drive down long-term interest rates by a few basis points. It has concluded it can survive the loss in mark-to-market value of its bond portfolio that higher interest rates will imply, when they come, by suspending its customary interest-rebate payments to the Treasury. If the Treasury was counting on that roughly $80 billion per year, that is Treasury's problem. If higher rates cost the Treasury $900 billion a year, that is Congress's problem.

The Treasury's Bureau of Public Debt controls the maturity of federal debt issues. It has been gently borrowing longer in response to low long-term rates, but not enough to substantially alter the government's interest-rate risk. The bureau also views its job narrowly—which is to finance whatever deficits Congress determines, not to take actions that mitigate future deficits. Congress and the administration are busy with other matters.

Ironically, the Fed's buying and the Treasury bureau's selling have neatly offset, leaving very little change in the maturity structure of debt in private hands.

What to do? First, the Treasury and Fed need a new "accord" to decide who is in charge of interest-rate risk, most likely the Treasury, and then grant it clear legal authority to manage that risk. The Fed should then swap its portfolio of long-term bonds for a portfolio of short-term Treasuries and forswear meddling in the maturity structure again.

Second, the Treasury should seize its once-in-a lifetime opportunity to go long. Thirty-year interest rates are at 2.8%, a 60-year low. Many corporations and homeowners are borrowing long to lock in low funding costs. So should the Treasury.

You may complain that if the Treasury borrows long, then long-term rates will rise. If so, it is better that everyone knows that now. It means that markets aren't really willing to buy long-term government debt, that the 2.8% yield is only a fiction of the Fed's current buying, and that it won't last long anyway. Better fix the fiscal hole, fast.

[WSJ cut: Moreover, if buying and selling a lot of bonds is a problem, the Treasury should engage in an aggressive swap program. In a swap, the Treasury pays a counterparty a fixed rate (say, 2.8%) and receives floating rates, with no bond changing hands. The First Bank of Podunk uses swaps to manage interest rate risk, when it doesn’t want to buy and sell assets. So can the Treasury.

You may complain about counterparty risk. But swaps are collateralized, so each counterparty does not lose if the other one defaults. And if the thousands of pages of Dodd-Frank regulation, and the army of stress testers can’t ensure that too-big-to-fail banks properly manage simple interest rate risk, then we really should have a law-book bonfire. ]

You also may argue that 2.8% long term-debt is more expensive than 0.16% one-year debt. There are two fallacies here. First, the 2.8% long-term yield reflects an expectation that short rates will rise in the future, so the expected cost over 30 years, as well as the true annual cost, are much closer to the same. Second, to the extent that long-term bonds really do pay more interest over their life span, this is the premium for insurance. Sure, running a restaurant is cheaper if you don't pay fire insurance. Until there is a fire.

A much longer maturity structure for government debt will buy a lot of insurance at a very low premium. It will buy the Fed control over monetary policy and preserve its independence. If Fed officials realized the risks, they would be screaming for longer maturities now.

But we don't have long to act. All forecasts say long-term rates will rise soon. As the car dealer says, this is a great deal, but only for today.



Notes: See this earlier blog post or pdf essay for more. I hope to sell WSJ on the second part, keeping the balance sheet big and Treasury floating-rate debt, sometime soon.

If you think I'm pessimistic or making up numbers, here are the CBO's baseline budget projections 


By 2023, the CBO thinks interest payments on the debt will be $857 billion, essentially the entire deficit!  The CBO assumes (see p. 67 here) that interest rates start rising in 2016 and in 2018 stop at 4% one year and 5.2% ten year rates. What if the Fed really wants to tighten?

Moreover, the cheery forecast of return to a balanced primary budget relies on an assumption of spectacular growth (p. 68) -- 3 years of 4% growth bringing us back to "potential" (see p.36) -- in-your-dreams tax revenues, and the rosy-scenario "baseline" expenditure cuts. What if the primary deficit is also $900 billion dollars?     
 

Wednesday, February 6, 2013

What's holding back the US economy?

This is a video I did with Steve Davis and Amir Sufi, moderated by Hal Weitzman, part of the new Chicago Booth "The Big Question" series. Youtube link here. I'm actually a lot calmer through most of it than I appear in the cover shot.

Sunday, February 3, 2013

Three views of consumption and the slow economy

I'm still digesting New-Keynesian models. As part of that effort, today I offer some thoughts on how economists come to such different views of the current situation and desirable policies. It's a nice story, in the end. Real economists, unlike much of the commentary and blogging world, come to different conclusions by using much the same model, but making different assumptions and simplifications, each of which we can look at and evaluate, and hopefully come to some consensus.


The economy is not doing well. The black line in the graph shows log consumption. (The units are percent increase in consumption since 2002.) After trending up steadily at close to 3% per year through the previous decade, consumption -- along with output and everything else -- took a dive, totaling 10% loss relative to the red trendline. And consumption has been stuck there ever since.

So, the big questions: why, and what might be done about it?

All current macroeconomic theories start with the same basic story: when interest rates are higher, people consume less today, save, and then consume more in the future. Higher real interest rates mean higher consumption growth. In equations,

(c represents log consumption, i is the interest rate, pi is inflation, rho and gamma are parameters. Rho is a "discount rate" capturing how much people prefer the present to the future, and gamma captures how strongly people react to interest rate changes. I simplified, leaving out uncertainty.)

We build on this insight in different ways. 

I. New Keynesians 

Integrating forward, today's consumption reflects all expected future interest rates, and where we think consumption will be in the far-off future

This is the central equation of the new-Keynesian model and world-view. (For example, this is Johannes Wieland's equation 2, see my last post. I have taken out growth or trend, so these represent deviations from a steady growth path.)

The green line in the graph presents the New-Keynesian diagnosis of the current situation. New-Keynesians assume consumption will return to trend, so the last term in the equation is zero. In the graph, they anchor future consumption at the green dot. Then, a too-high interest rate means too-high consumption growth, which drives the level of today's consumption down.  (For example,  Ivan Werning's figure 3, discussed in an earlier post here.)

Why is the interest rate too high? The "zero lower bound" is to blame. The Fed cannot lower nominal interest rates (i) below zero. So if the inflation and discount rate terms (pi and rho) require a strongly negative nominal rate, the real rate will be stuck at a big positive number.

From this one equation and graph, you can make sense of lots and lots of new-Keynesian analysis and policy advice.

The level of today's consumption depends on the whole string of future interest rates, not just today's interest rate. So, if people expect the interest rate in 2014 to be lower, that is every bit as effective in raising today's consumption as would be lowering today's rate. Hence, "open mouth operations," "forward guidance," and "managing expectations."  If the Fed by just talking can persuade people it will hold interest rates low for a longer periods, when they are expecting rates to rise above zero, that expectation will "stimulate" today's consumption. If promises don't help, perhaps announcing a new "rule" which if followed would lead to lower rates for longer will help to change expectations.

In this equation, more inflation lowers the real interest rate too. So, anything that boosts inflation is a good thing. Boosting inflation isn't primarily about a Phillips curve, direct "monetary stimulus," encouraging investment, and so on. It's a way to lower real interest rates inside the integral and shift consumption from the future to the present.

Once again, increasing expected future inflation would be just as effective as increasing current inflation. Hence, calls for the Fed to announce a higher inflation target, or at least announce that it will tolerate more inflation before beginning to raise rates, as it has.

Fiscal stimulus, and many of the other seemingly magical properties of new-Keynesian models (see  last post) follow from the idea that inflation is good. Fiscal stimulus raises inflation. Broken windows, hurricanes, pointless public works projects, temporarily lowering the economy's productive capacity, all raise inflation (how is in other equations of the model), which lowers interest rates.

I'm not sold on this story, as you probably guessed, for a variety of reasons.  

New Keynesian models are a bit fuzzy on just why interest rates have to be so low -- why the "natural rate" is sharply negative and why zero interest rates aren't enough. Many of the formal models assume that consumer's discount rate (rho) has declined sharply, beyond the capacity of the interest rate to follow it. If rho goes to, say -5%, with our 2% inflation, then even a zero nominal interest rate is like a 3% real interest rate. (These are deviations from trend, so one might not need actually negative discount rates to hit the zero bound. But even adding growth, it's hard to avoid the need for a negative natural rate to cause a problem of this size.)

Now, a spontaneous outbreak of thrift, to the point of valuing the future a lot more than the present, seems a bit of a strained diagnosis for the fundamental trouble of the US economy. That a bit more thrift is a great danger to the economy, rather than the long awaited return to normal after decades of debt-financed consumption, seems strained as well.

To be fair, all the papers I've read say clearly that they regard the decline in the discount rate rho as a stand-in for some more complex process involving the financial crisis. For example, a more precise version of my first equation adds a "precautionary saving" term. When people are very uncertain about the future, they save more, just as if they had become much more patient. In equations,

This story seems possible for 2008 and 2009, in the depths of the financial crisis and recession. But I'm less convinced that it describes our current moment. Just look at the graph. Our state is one of steady but sclerotic growth, not one of great consumption volatility.

New-Keynesian introductions have something more complex in mind, involving the "frictions" of the financial crisis, and lots of models in this spirit add explicit financial frictions. That too seems to me a useful line to pursue to understand the onset of the recession and the financial crisis. But that too is really not our question. The  "frictions" of the financial crisis -- capital constraints at banks and financial intermediaries,  or the run in the shadow banking system -- passed quite a while ago, and the models with frictions are by and large not being used to address the current moment. 

The question before us is not really why consumption fell so drastically in 2008 and 2009. The question is, why did consumption get stuck at so low a level starting in 2010? For this question, it's much harder for me to understand what a strongly negative discount rate means.

This question and controversy is much like those surrounding the Great Depression. The controversy there has not been about why the stock market crash and recession happened in the first place. (Though perhaps it should, as we really don't know much about that process.) The controversy is, why did the US get stuck so low for so long? Was it bad monetary policy (Friedman and Schwartz), bad microeconomic policy, war on capital, and high marginal tax rates (Cole, Ohanian, Prescott, etc.), or inadequate fiscal stimulus (Keynesians)? 

Many new-Keynesian models (such as Ivan Werning's) generate the high real interest rate by predicting strong deflation. Yes, if inflation (pi) were negative 10% in (2), then a zero interest rate would be a 10% positive real rate. But our inflation has been positive throughout. Our zero interest rate has meant a negative 1.5% to 2.5% real rate all along. Deflation simply did not happen. Moreover, the other ingredient in new-Keynesian modeling -- the Phillips curve -- says that a big output gap should be accompanied by some action on inflation, not a steady 2%.  The Phillips curve part of the model suggests that "potential" dropped, not that current output is far below that potential.

I graphed the green line to 2010, a good date for supposing the crisis is over and we entered the period of sclerotic growth rather than swift return to trend. We've had some time since 2010. Again, the new-Keynesian model generates a low consumption level by saying that we have too-strong consumption growth. But we don't have strong consumption growth. Equation (2) does not produce a steadily depressed level of consumption, with (if anything) weaker than normal growth. I guess you could argue for a constant sequence of unexpected negative shocks, so that each quarter, people are expecting the big consumption growth which just ends up not happening. But you can see how strained that argument is. It would be much more appealing to refer to a model and analysis that describes slumponomics directly.  (Update: I just found Kathryn Dominguez and Matt Shaprio on a sequence of negative shocks.)

And, you might be exploding a bit at the economic logic of it all. How can it be that all we need to do is to decide how much to consume, and the output just magically appears? Doesn't consumption have to be limited a bit by income?

Well, the new-Keynesian models are coherent on this subject. The simple models have no capital; output is produced by more or less labor each period. The logical structure of the models, is, roughly, that you first decide how much you want to consume, then you'll work hard enough to make the required income. (This isn't a behavioral assumption, it's the equilibrium outcome of sticky prices and monopolistic competition.)

That's why fiscal stimulus works at all. You might think that if you have to pay taxes to the goverment, which buys output to throw it away, you'll have to consume less.  (Again, stimulus in these models is Ricardian so the same whether from taxed or borrowed money, and stimulus does not depend on the government doing anything useful with the output.) But if consumption is determined first by the above equation, then you just work harder to pay taxes and make the stuff the government wants to throw away. That gives us a multiplier of one, not zero, and then inflation kicks in to raise desired consumption and give us a larger multiplier. (Roughly! Again, I'm trying to explain the core simplest idea, not to fairly describe all the complexities of the models.)

The very simple new-Keynesian model also does not have investment or capital stock. Output is produced as you need it. That's why consumption "demand" immediately means changes in output. I've always wondered why buying a car is good (consumption) but buying a forklift is bad (investment) in new-Keynesian models. You just can't ask that question in the very simplified model here -- there is no investment. Now, real quantitative new-Keynesian models do have investment and capital (with adjustment costs and other wedges). But as far as I can tell, the same basic conclusions emerge from models with capital, so the intuition must be as here, in which consumption is everything.

II Permanent income

An alternative view asks, what about the second term on the right hand side of the basic equation (2)?  What if nothing's terribly wrong with the intertemporal allocation of consumption, but the long-run productive capacity of the economy has declined?

There is certainly an abundant litany of such complaints. What if all the over regulation (Obamacare, Dodd-Frank, EPA "crucifixions," etc.), sand in the gears, disincentives of social programs, crony capitalism, policy uncertainty, high and prospectively much higher marginal tax rates, and other litany of complaints, have permanently reduced the productive capacity of the US economy, or, worse, its long run growth rate? Then we are not returning to trend. The trend has shifted down.

If so, the trouble is in the second term on the right hand side of the basic equation (2). And this basic equation has a dramatic and important lesson for us: Long-run ("supply") will depress today's consumption every bit as much as expected future interest rates ("demand") effects do. And improving the long-run "supply" effects can have a direct "stimulative" effect on consumption today.

I italicized, because I think this is an underappreciated consequence of the common world-view of all modern macroeconomics, both new-Keynesian and not, embodied in (2). The old-Keynesian view was,  take care of the short run now, because helping the long run only helps in the long run. You hear this over and over in policy circles. More stimulus now, and then talk about "structural reform" once the economy has recovered. Equation (2) denies that separation:  Improving the long run improves the present. 

I drew the blue line to reflect this view of matters. For an equation, we can turn to our old friend the permanent income model

Here W represents wealth (capital stock), r is the real rate r = i - pi, and y represents the stream of expected future income. This is an extremely oversimplified version of the standard stochastic growth model at the heart of... well, I don't know what to call us anymore. "Neoclassical?" "Anybody left who is a bit suspicous of the new-Keynesian juggernaut?"

The difference is really one of emphasis, not deep economics. (3) also derives from (1), but with a different set of auxiliary assumptions. The real interest rate is constant at r. There is capital W, and investment freely adds or subtracts from capital. Labor's product y is fixed rather than produced.

Again, this model is, like (2), extremely simplified. Yes, interest rates do vary, and it's easy enough to add that to the model.  Similarly, new-Keynesians know there is capital and investment.  We're outlining basic stories today, not constructing completely realistic, but often obscure and complex, models.

In this equation, the level of consumption shifts up and down along with expectations of permanent income. So, if you get news that the productive efficiency of the economy is permanently 10% lower, consumption drops 10%, and then goes on at the previous growth rate. As, by picking 2010 as the decision date, my graph suggests.

Like the new-Keynesians,  I won't be that specific here about just why consumption fell so drastically in the financial crisis.  The permanent income model does suggest that we look for changes in permanent income to explain the fall, rather than (only) a rise in discount rates or real interest rates, i.e. the desired intertemporal allocation of consumption.  From this perspective, consumers realized in fall 2008, that this recession was going to last forever rather than bounce back quickly, and they adjusted consumption downward accordingly. They were right. Just how they knew, when all the Government's forecasters thought we would quickly bounce back, is an interesting question.  Surely, my litany of free-marketer's complaints did not obvioulsy get suddenly worse in October 2008, just coincident with a run in the shadow banking system.  Well, maybe not so surely. Maybe consumers thought, we're in a horrible banking crisis, and our government is likely to prolong this one with ham-handed policies just like they did in the 1930s. But that's pretty speculative. And I do think (just as speculatively) there was a run in the shadow banking system, effective risk aversion spiked, and the financial crisis was more than just a signal of bad policy to come.

But all that is a topic for another day. The question is why consumption (and output) remain so low for so long after the crisis, when whatever outside-the-model chaos is over. The permanent income view suggests the problem is a poor long-term level, poor long-term prospects for the productive capacity of the economy, not too high growth, to an unchanged long-term level.

In this view, the Fed largely wasting its time with all its QEs and promises about future interest rates. The right policy answer is to forget about stimulating and fine tuning. Fix the long-run growth problem and the short run will take care of itself, much faster than you might have thought. This isn't the Fed's job. For Europe, do the "structural reforms" now and you'll start growing now in anticipation of their effect.

Moreover, in the underlying stochastic growth model, a rise in real interest rates is a good thing. Yes, we can get on the new-Keynesian green trajectory. What does that is a rise in the marginal product of capital, which raises interest rates, attracts investment, and leads to greater output. In that model, consumption is (very roughly) anchored at its position today, and increased interest rates raise future consumption, not the other way around. Of course, in the stochastic growth model, the Fed can't raise interest rates all on its own --  a higher marginal product of capital comes from greater efficiency or better technology. Still, it encapsulates the comments you read here and there that maybe the conventional sign is wrong -- maybe higher interest rates are desirable, as a sign of a good thing, not as a cause of a bad thing. There is always supply and demand in economics, and two sides to every question.

Which view is right? To my eyes, consumption seems stuck on a lower trend line, not growing sharply. Real interest rates are already negative -- we do not have deflation -- and I find it hard to believe that the discount rate and marginal product of capital are negative 5% or worse. The very large discount rate shock needed for the new-Keynesian story is pretty nebulous. The shocks to long-run productivity are staring us in the face.

I wish, of course, for more serious structural investigation to separate the two stories. I haven't seen a serious attempt to look at the structure of the US economy and measure a sharp negative "natural rate." (I welcome pointers from commenters.) I would welcome a quantitative assessment of how much the level of GDP is depressed from my litany of free-market complaints. With trillions of dollars of GDP, and potentially trillions of wasted stimulus at stake, you'd think we could do better.  

I want to emphasize, this is not a fight between models. This is the same model, with different emphasis, and different simplifications. There is nothing in the new-Keynesian modeling paradigm that forbids one to ask the question, what if the long-run productivity of the economy has sunk and high real rates are not the problem? The models were developed to talk about other things, to talk about historical "cycles" defined as deviations from "trend." Nothing but old habits prohibits one from asking the opposite questions.

III. Old Keynesians

A traditional view of consumption has been conspicuously absent so far, the textbook old-Keynesian consumption function

Consumption depends on today's income through the "marginal propensity to consume" mpc.

Modern new-Keynesian models are utterly different from this traditional view. Lots of people, especially in policy, commentary, and blogging circles, like to wave their hands over the equations of new Keynesian models and claim they provide formal cover for traditional old-Keynesian intuition, with all the optimization, budget constraints, and market clearing conditions that the old-Keynesian analysis never really got right taken care of. A quick look at our equations and the underlying logic shows that this is absolutely not the case.

Consider how lowering interest rates is supposed to help. In the old Keynesian model, investment I = I(r) responds to lower interest rates, output and income Y = C + I + G, so rising investment raises income, which raises consumption in (4), which raises income some more, and so on. By contrast, the simple new-Keynesian model needs no investment, and interest rates simply rearrange consumption demand over time.

Similarly, consider how raising government spending is supposed to help. In the old Keynesian model,  raising G in Y = C + I + G raises Y, which raises consumption C by (4), which raises Y some more, and so on. In the new-Keynesian model, the big multiplier comes because raising government spending raises inflation, which lowers interest rates, and once again brings consumption forward in time.

Old-Keynesians spent two generations fighting against the intertemporal view of consumption embodied in my first two equations, and now at the heart of the new-Keynesian model, in favor of the last equation. They said consumers were "liquidity constrained," or "rule of thumb," their expectations (if they had any) "adaptive," either too stupid to look forward in time or unable to do so.

I must confess a little sympathy to some of these views. A long long time ago I wrote a paper on "near-rationality" criticizing excessive zeal in the application of equation (1). Really, if the Fed today raises interest rates to 12% (annual rate) for a month, would everybody's consumption fall one percent today, so that it could rise one percentage point over the next month? Or is the relation between consumption and interest rates one of those looser relations that yes, applies roughly, for large sustained changes, and over long time periods, but not necessarily instantly?

In any case, a look at (1) and its application in (2) tells us that Friedman won more than he could possibly have imagined. Intertemporal optimization is now not the heretical pariah suggesting a low marginal propensity to consume and low multiplier, but it is the heart of the model. The Lucas-Sargent-Prescott revolution pervades new-Keynesian models as much as their more classical counterparts. Consumers are forward-looking. Expectations matter. No self-respecting mid 1970s Keynesian would have said that Fed pronouncements about what interest rates were going to be in 2016 -- or how the future unemployment rate would condtion that choice -- would have the slightest effect at all on today's consumption. Consumers are myopic, he would say. Expectations are adaptive.
 
But as a result, the new-Keynesian model really has nothing to do with the old-Keynesian intuition.

IV. Bottom line

Enough history of thought, though. The relevant choice today is between the first two alternatives. Are we in a situation where the long run is just fine, but the zero bound is forcing us to have too high interest rates, so consumption growth is too high and the level is depressed? Or are we in a situation that consumers doubt the long-run productive capacity of the economy, and are consuming little today because they expect to consume little tomorrow and little 10 years from now?

The answer matters: whether the economy can be stimulated merely by more solemn promises from the Fed about future interest rates and inflation, by broken-window interventions that reduce supply today to engender some inflation, or whether the economy must be stimulated today by ignoring short-run stimulus, fixing the long run, and counting on the permanent income model to increase consumption, and the present value model (q theory) to increase investment today.

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P.S. It's 2013. Why is displaying math in html so hard?! The people who developed the internet are all nerd engineers who took calculus! I'm back to  pasting in png files to show equations. I tried mathjax, but it only seems to work on traditional screens, not in mobile, rss, etc. Suggestions welcome.

P.P.S. Martin Boulanger and Absalon below asked if maybe consumption wasn't growing unsustainably before the crash. Here's a longer view of the first graph, with my 2000-2007 trend line.
Or, even go back to 1945.
A big boom in the 2000's does not stick out from the consumption data. If anything, it was a little weaker than usual.

Also, yes, this is total consumption. Nondurable and services does not look much different. I started to break out the components but the post was getting too long.

Saturday, January 19, 2013

More new-Keynesian paradoxes

Last week I saw Johannes Wieland's paper "Are negative supply shocks expansionary at the zero lower bound?"  A side benefit of the job market season is that we see interesting new papers like this one, and it contributed to my project of trying to better understand new-Keynesian models.

Though starting academic papers with blog quotations is usually a bad idea, Johannes starts with a great and very appropriate one,
As some of us keep trying to point out, the United States is in a liquidity trap: [...] This puts us in a world of topsy-turvy, in which many of the usual rules of economics cease to hold. Thrift leads to lower investment; wage cuts reduce employment; even higher productivity can be a bad thing. And the broken windows fallacy ceases to be a fallacy: something that forces firms to replace capital, even if that something seemingly makes them poorer, can stimulate spending and raise employment.” -Paul Krugman
I endorse this quote, because it is an accurate and pithy description of the properties of many careful new-Keynesian analyses in the academic literature.

 Johannes explains
Does destroying productive capacity raise output when the zero lower bound (ZLB) binds? [ZLB: When interest rates are zero, the Fed can't lower them any more in response to shocks -JC] While this question may seem absurd, in fact it is a common prediction of many macroeconomic models: In these models, temporary negative supply shocks raise inflation expectations and lower expected real interest rates at the ZLB, which stimulates consumption and output. While some prominent economists have subscribed to this view and its policy implications (e.g., Eggertsson and Woodford [2003], Eggertsson and Krugman [2011], Eggertsson [2012]), there is wide disagreement over such a radical and unintuitive proposition.
Indeed there is.

These are just the beginning of the strange predictions new-Keynesian models (or modelers) make.

"Fiscal stimulus" is the prediction that even completely wasted government spending is good for the economy. Paul Krugman recommended, with refreshing clarity, that the US government fake an alien invasion so we could spend trillions of dollars building useless defenses. (I'm not exactly sure why he does not call for real defense spending. After all, if building aircraft carriers saved the economy in 1941, and defenses against imaginary aliens would save the economy in 2013, it's not clear why real aircraft carriers have the opposite effect. But I'm still working on the nuances of new-Keynesianism, so I'll let him explain the difference. I'm not a big fan of huge defense spending anyway.)

Furthermore, all the new-Keynesian models are "Ricardian." They predict the same stimulus whether spending is financed by borrowing or by lump-sum taxes  today. Good, we don't need to argue about "Ricardian equivalence," but to believe their predictions for spending borrowed money, you have to believe that taxing you and me a trillion dollars and spending it on a trillion dollars of alien defenses will raise overall output by 2, 3, or 4 (you can get really big multipliers in these models) trillion dollars.

Actually, stimulus financed by temporary payroll taxes can be even better than from borrowing money. These are a negative supply shock, which causes inflation and lowers the real interest rate. Sand in the gears is good. Stimulus financed by temporary consumption taxes is worse, because that encourages saving. Promises of higher future consumption taxes, anathema in the standard view of the world, are good, as they get people to consume today.

Super-weirdly, many new-Keyensian paradox predictions get worse as the central friction, price stickiness, gets better.

Johannes again on the new-Keynesian paradoxes:
First, according to the “Paradox of Thrift,” a rise in the desire to save is self-defeating at the ZLB, because it reduces output so much that aggregate savings fall (Keynes [1936], Krugman [1998], Eggertsson and Woodford [2003], and Christiano [2004]). Second, according to the “Paradox of Flexibility,” output volatility may rise at the ZLB when prices and wages are more flexible (e.g., Werning [2011], Eggertsson and Krugman [2011]).
My empirical results concern primarily the “Paradox of Toil” (Eggertsson [2010]), whereby a temporary increase in desired labor supply at the ZLB reduces the equilibrium employment level in standard models. .... Following this logic, payroll tax cuts are contractionary at the ZLB because they lower expected inflation (Eggertsson [2011]), and allowing collusion among firms is expansionary because it raises expected inflation (Eggertsson [2012]).
A pause in praise of economic models: They tie ideas together. You can't pick and choose. If you like stimulus with borrowed money, but suspect that tax-financed stimulus might not work so well, you can't just waive your hands and refer to new-Keynesian models to defend you. These models predict the two policies have the same effect. If you like your stimulus, but think that maybe hurricanes wiping out a bunch of the capital stock isn't great, sorry, you can't refer to new-Keynesian models to defend you. If you don't buy one of Krugman's assertions, you don't buy any of them. (At a minimum, you have to build a new variant of model -- you can't refer to existing new-Keynesian models to defend you.) To taste fish, you have to swallow the whole whale, hook, line, and sinker.

So, back to Johannes. He notes that the models predict quite different behavior away from the bound than at the bound, so conventional estimates don't really tell us that much about whether these predictions are true. But we have enough experience with economies at the lower bound now, that we can begin to test some of these astonishing predictions.

(Minor suggestion for PhD students. The key requirement for these predictions is that the Fed does not change the nominal interest rate in response to shocks. There have actually been other periods of time when central banks have fixed nominal interest rates, for example between 1945 and 1952 in the US. More generally, the general new-Keynesian view is that interest rates did not respond enough to shocks before 1980. So in fact, versions of the paradoxes should be visible in data away from the zero bound.)

Johannes looks at the earthquake in Japan, and oil price shocks. Surprise, surprise, earthquakes are bad for output. More subtly, the new-Keynesian prediction flows through inflation: "Supply shocks" should raise expected inflation, which lowers real interest rates, and lower real interest rates should raise consumption and output. (As I explained last week, new-Keynesian models anchor expected consumption in the far off future. Then real interest rates determine the growth rate of consumption, and higher growth means a lower level today. In the models consumption=output. See Johannes' equation 2 page 7.) Johannes finds that the supply shocks led to higher expected inflation, and hence a lower real rate. But the lower real rate just didn't have the predicted effect on output. In fact, he finds that oil shocks have worse negative effects on employment at the zero bound than in normal times!

Like all provocative empirical work, I'm sure this one will be picked over. The Booth Macroeconomics workshop did its usual good job of exploring nooks and crannies. But let us also pause in praise of serious empirical work. Rather than blurt "this is ridicuous!" let us go see if indeed earthquakes, hurricanes, labor market restrictions, oligopolization and other normally adverse "supply" shocks actually help the economy. The sun might just come up in the West at the zero bound.

Where to go from here? If I had this great introduction, and results that rather decisively reject a central night-is-day new-Keynesian proposition, clearly linked to all the others, I would obviously have been tempted to write it up as "this model is wrong," and dig deep into which key assumptions of the model drive its basic mistakes. Johannes takes another tack, and adds credit constraints to the model. Whether this is a successful repair or a clever epicycle I will leave for another time -- and frankly I haven't studied it closely enough to opine yet.  How many of the paradoxes it overturns is another good question. It seems to overturn quite a few. But the paradoxes are also the sexy policy implications.  It may save new-Keynesian models from their prediction that hurricanes are good, by destroying the new-Keynesian multiplier.

Monday, October 22, 2012

Christina Romer on Stimulus

(Small update to clarify in response to early comments)
Christiana Romer has an important column in Sunday's New York Times on the stimulus. You will recall that as chair of the Council of Economic advisers, she played a big part in designing the stimulus, and forecasting its effects. She also is one of the preeminent academics who have done empirical work evaluating the effects of stimulus programs. You expect a thoughtful essay.



She explains how cause-and-effect empirical work in economics is hard
To understand what’s wrong with that reasoning, think of someone who’s been in a terrible accident and has massive internal bleeding. After lifesaving surgery, the patient still feels rotten. But we shouldn’t conclude from this lingering pain that the surgery was useless — because without it, the patient would have died.

Without knowing where the economy was headed in the absence of the stimulus, it’s impossible to judge what it contributed just from what happened afterward. That’s why empirical economists rely on other approaches.
This is really good compared to the usual "of course it worked you blockhead" sort of argument from stimulus sympathizers (you know who, and "blockhead" is being polite).

Of course I might have used the image of doctors bleeding the patient, applying poultices or voodoo, and then claiming great power when the patient heals on his own, but the principle is the same.
A growing literature examines the effects of such tax cuts and increases in government spending over history and across countries, and the overwhelming conclusion is that fiscal stimulus raises employment and output in the near term.
Wow, that's strong. .
..states that received more money [for random reasons] fared substantially better. This is the strongest direct evidence that the Recovery Act contributed to employment growth. Based on the estimated size of the effect, the studies suggest that the act created more than three million jobs. 
This does not follow at all. I don't think anyone disagrees with the proposition that if the government takes money from residents of state A and splashes them on state B, the economy of state B improves.  But this totally evades the whole issue: what about state A? This is the entirety of the stimulus debate: The government can transfer resources, but not get resources to fall from the sky. (Whether it taxes or borrows form the residents of state A, it's still transferring resources.) Stimulus is  supposed to raise aggregate demand, not transfer demand from state A to state B.  Yes, if the government builds a military base in the desert, GDP in that desert goes up. From this, stimulus raising the whole country does not follow.

The web version cites the studies. I've read about half of them, and they are careful not to jump to this conclusion. (This is about cross-state studies. There is another industry of time-series studies, trying to see if times when the US overall has stimulated it did any good. That's another issue, which Romer doesn't talk about, so I will also put off for another day.)

She goes on,
In addition to its near-term jobs effects, the Recovery Act may also be having more lasting benefits. It’s too early to measure the value of the roads, bridges...
Fine, but that's not the issue either, and never was. Sure, if there is a positive rate of return investment, make it, and a recession is a good time to do it. But the argument for Keynesian stimulus is that spending money helps the economy at that moment, whether or not it does any long run good. Paul Krugman is admirably honest by  advocating we fake an alien invasion so we can build useless defenses. (I'm not sure why he's not for building useless ships and submarines, but that's for another day.) Whether that works is the issue, not whether the money turned out not to have been totally wasted.

She discusses some faults of the stimulus, finishing with
Finally, there’s little question that policy makers — myself included — should have worked harder to earn the public’s support for the act.
Well, I might say, now is a good time to start. The question for our time is whether stimulus was a great tool rediscovered or a grand failure waiting the ash heap of history. If its central architect, and a noted scholar, has to stoop to such illogical arguments to summarize our experience, I'd say earning support is unlikely.

Wednesday, October 17, 2012

Are recoveries always slow after financial crises and why

Carmen Reinhart and Ken Rogoff have an interesting new Bloomberg column, "Sorry, U.S. recoveries really aren't different." They point to the great Barry Eichengreen and Kevin O'Rourke "Tale of two depressions: what do the new data tell us" columns. (Hat tip, commenter Tim to "slow recoveries after financial crises" who asked what I think. Here's the answer)

Reinhart and Rogoff go after the sequence of studies who have questioned their assertion that recessions after financial crisis are deeper and recoveries slower.
As you can imagine, the argument quickly runs into measurement and sample debates. Reinhart and Rogoff say "Part of the confusion may be attributed to a failure to distinguish systemic financial crises from more minor ones" and "The distinction between a systemic and a borderline event is well established."

Me, I'm still waiting for an economically meaningful definition of "systemic" better than "we'll know it when we see it."  So, the premise here is that there is a clear, visible separation between business cycles associated with (let's all be careful not to jump to "caused by") "systemic" financial crises, "non-systemic" financial crises, and other recessions. I've been doing macro for 30 years, and this clear understanding of the shocks behind any recessions has eluded all the rest of us.

Then, we fight about "how a recovery is measured, and how success is defined." You can feel your eyes getting heavy.

But all this is really beside the point. This latest update does not address or change my basic problem with the whole exercise so far, as it has evolved in the policy debate. (Collecting data is unobjectionable!)

First of all, let us distinguish between recessions following financial crises are "on average" worse and longer or "always" worse and longer, as RR are often misquoted to say -- but they don't do much to clear up the misquote. Recessions following even their definitions of "systemic crisis" vary tremendously in length and depth.

Second, it therefore does not follow that recessions even if  "on average" are worse and longer are "inevitably" worse and longer. Hey, it's not our fault, it's just a law of nature. No. Some recessions are bad and long. Others less so.

Third, then, and most of all, I don't know how we can have this conversation at all without even whispering what the mechanism  might be.

Here's my tentative view: Sure, recessions are worse and longer after financial crises...because governments go completely haywire and screw things up after financial crises. They bail out banks. They hike taxes on "the rich." They transfer wealth. They bail out borrowers. They stomp all over property rights (GM.) Thus, they kill capital markets for a generation. They clamp down on the financial system in horse-left-the-barn efforts to regulate "safety." (We are in this paradox of the 3% mortgage that nobody can qualify for.) They try big "stimulus" plans. They often end up with unsustainable government debts leading to sovereign default or inflation. I'm not making this up. Most of this is in Reinhart and Rogoff's book!  So, perhaps if recessions are longer and deeper after financial crises, not as a matter of economics, but as a matter of particularly bad policy. This is the opposite of inevitability!

You don't have to agree with me, but agree it's logically possible. If so, then the refrain of "recessions are always longer and deeper after financial crises" starts to ring pretty hollow, doesn't it? There is an unwitting implication that the historical average measures some law of economics, that has nothing to do with economic policies. That seems like a pretty big assumption!

Do RR disagree? If so, let's hear loud and clear what they think the economic mechanism is, let's see evidence, and let's see and why policy after such events is only a combination of more or less benevolent responses. Not a word.

The great depression is a wonderful example here. It followed a "systemic" financial crisis by any definition, even mine. (I know it when I see it too!) It was longer or deeper than anything we've seen since as the lovely graph from Eichengreen and O'Rourke on the left here reminds us.

 Now, every single writer  on the great depression thinks it was long and deep primarily because.... wrongheaded government policy made it long and deep. Monetarists point to the Fed, not expanding the money supply enough, reserve requirements, the gold standard, etc. Keynesians think Roosevelt didn't stimulate enough, and only world war II saved us. The wave of new "neoclassical" scholarship points to the disasters of the NRA, cartelization of industries, "war on capital," 70% marginal tax rates,  Smoot-Hawley, financial regulation, unions, etc. Nobody, but nobody thinks the great depression was deep and long because, oh well, that's always the way things are after financial crises.

So why is the 2008 - now recession exempt from the same critique? Why are we following some law of economic nature?  If we don't even talk about mechanism, I don't see how all the averages in the world mean anything.

So what is the message? The closest RR get is to tippy toe around it at the end
This doesn’t mean that policy is irrelevant, of course. On the contrary, at the depth of the recent financial crisis, there was almost certainly a risk of a second Great Depression. However, although it is clear that the challenges in recovering from financial crises are daunting, an early recognition of the likely depth and duration of the problem would certainly have been helpful, particularly in assessing various responses and their attendant risks. 
This is very coy. So, what more than $1.5 trillion deficits (in Keyneisan economics, the whole deficit counts, not just the part labeled "stimulus") and $1.5 trillion monetary expansion do they think the Obama administration and Ben Bernanke should or would they have done, if only they had panicked a little bit more? And are they not acknowledging here that the length and depth of recessions has everything to do with policy, and is not measuring some law of economic nature?

Eichengreen and O'Rourke echo a more explicit sentiment
..policymakers should note that the level of industrial production is still 6% below its previous peak (figure 1). (At the trough it was 13% below its previous peak.) It follows that considerable excess capacity remains in a number of important economies. Exiting now from policies of stimulus in those countries would therefore be premature.
Well, the historical record as they have presented it says absolutely nothing about the efficacy of fiscal stimulus. Neither set of authors claims that, holding the severity of "systemic" financial crises fixed, they have evidence that countries with larger stimulus programs exited more quickly. In fact, RR's compilation of sovereign defaults and inflations after financial crises might suggest exactly the opposite, as a certain regret over stimulus might be settling in in Europe right now.

Without mention of cause, the historical record is just as consistent with my view: a financial crisis can lead to a deep and prolonged recession... so we can't indulge in the usual stimulus/bailout quack medicine that governments follow, which worsens recessions after financial crises.

But Reinhart and Rogoff, with the great data at their fingertips, could be writing about which policies are associated with quicker and slower recoveries. OK, I said "associated,"  and they do say
It is not our intention to closely analyze policy responses that may take years of study to sort out,
If the correlations  come back in ways that don't make sense, will will have a good argument whether  governments that got lucky on recoveries were able to indulge in silly policies.  But since they're basically opining that the Obama administration should have tried stimulus north of 10% of GDP, that cat's out of the bag, and we might as well be debating these facts, not just the averages.

Bottom line, without thinking about mechanisms I don't think we learn anything from these averages. And both sides of the debate are making some big, and often contradictory assumptions. If you conclude "recessions are always long and deep after financial crises" then you're saying policy doesn't really matter...so you shouldn't be advocating different policies! If policies matter a lot to the length and severity of recessions, then "recessions are always deep and long after financial crisis" is a meaningless statistic, and a poor fig leaf of an excuse.