Job market doldrums

Three recent views on the dismal labor market pose an interesting contrast.

Alan Blinder wrote a provocative WSJ piece on 6/11, Fiscal Fixes for the Jobless Recovery. A week prviously, 6/5, Ed Lazear wrote about The Hidden Jobless Disaster. And John Taylor has a good short blog post Job Growth–Barely Keeping Pace with Population

All three authors emphasize that the unemployment rate is a poor measure of the labor market. Unemployment counts people who don't have a job but are actively looking for one. People who give up and leave the labor force don't count. Employment is a more interesting number, and the employment-population ratio a better summary statistic than the unemployment rate. After all, if unemployment falls because everyone who is looking for a job gives up, I don't think we'd see that as a good sign.

Source: Wall Street Journal

Ed Lazear made this interesting chart. As he explains,

Every time the unemployment rate changes, analysts and reporters try to determine whether unemployment changed because more people were actually working or because people simply dropped out of the labor market entirely... The employment rate—that is, the employment-to-population ratio—eliminates this issue by going straight to the bottom line, measuring the proportion of potential workers who are actually working.

While the unemployment rate has fallen over the past 3½ years, the employment-to-population ratio has stayed almost constant at about 58.5%, well below the prerecession peak. Jobs are always being created and destroyed, and the net number of jobs over the last 3½ years has increased. But so too has the size of the working-age population. Job growth has been just slightly better than what it takes to keep the employed proportion of the working-age population constant. That's why jobs still seem so scarce.

The U.S. is not getting back many of the jobs that were lost during the recession. At the present slow pace of job growth, it will require more than a decade to get back to full employment defined by prerecession standards....

Why have so many workers dropped out of the labor force and stopped actively seeking work? Partly this is due to sluggish economic growth. But research by the University of Chicago's Casey Mulligan has suggested that because government benefits are lost when income rises, some people forgo poor jobs in lieu of government benefits—unemployment insurance, food stamps and disability benefits among the most obvious. The disability rolls have grown by 13% and the number receiving food stamps by 39% since 2009.
....

John Taylor makes the point nicely with another graph, which contrasts the labor force participation rate to the BLS' forecast of what should have happened from demographic effects.

The graph comes from a recent paper Chris Erceg and Andrew Levin.

I part company a bit with Lazear on his conclusions

... the various programs of quantitative easing (and other fiscal and monetary policies) have not been particularly effective at stimulating job growth. Consequently, the Fed may want to reconsider its decision to maintain a loose-money policy until the unemployment rate dips to 6.5%.

If low employment is "structural," resulting from the worker-side disincentives as well as employer-side disincentives -- policy uncertainty, regulatory threats, NLRB, Obamacare, Dodd-Frank, EPA, and so on -- then the problem isn't lack of "demand" in the first place. If the problem has nothing to do with the Fed, and if $2 trillion of QE didn't do anything to help it, why does the solution have anything to do with the Fed?

The greater surprise is to hear so much agreement from Alan Blinder:

The Brookings Institution's Hamilton Project, with which I am associated, estimates each month what it calls the "jobs gap," defined as the number of jobs needed to return employment to its prerecession levels and also absorb new entrants to the labor force. The project's latest jobs-gap estimate is 9.9 million jobs. At a rate of 194,000 a month, it would take almost eight more years to eliminate that gap.

.... policy makers should be running around like their hair is on fire.

Lazear said "a decade."  More suprising agreement on the impotence of monetary policy:

The Federal Reserve has worked overtime to spur job creation, and there is not much more it can do.

As you might imagine, I'm not such a fan of Blinder's suggested fixes. He starts with traditional simple Keynesian recommendations that  the government should hire people and "spend" more. No need to refight that here. The more interesting recommendations follow as he warms up to his latest clever scheme.

... the basic idea is straightforward: Offer tax breaks to firms that boost their payrolls.

For example, companies might be offered a tax credit equal to 10% of the increase in their wage bills over the previous year. ...

Another sort of business tax cut may hold more political promise....Suppose Congress enacted a partial tax holiday that allowed companies to repatriate profits held abroad at some bargain-basement tax rate like 10%. The catch: The maximum amount each company could bring home at that low tax rate would equal the increase in its wage payments as measured by Social Security records.

For example, if XYZ Corporation paid wages covered by Social Security of $1 billion in 2012 and $1.1 billion in 2013, it would be allowed to repatriate $100 million at the superlow tax rate. The reward for boosting its payroll by $100 million would thus be a $25 million tax saving. That looks like a powerful incentive.

...companies could claim the tax benefit only for individual earnings below the Social Security maximum ($113,700 in 2013). No subsidies for raising executive pay.

I find this most interesting at the level of basic philosophy; how we think about economic policy.

There are huge, longstanding, tax and regulatory disincentives to hiring people. Income tax, payroll taxes, health care and other mandates, and NLRB, OSHA, and so on. There are the high marginal taxes to labor implied by social insurance programs, as Mulligan points out.  If we want to increase the incentive for companies to hire people and people to take the jobs, why add another tax break to an obscenely complex tax code, rather than fix some of the existing disincentives? 

Is this really the right way to run a country? When "policy makers" want more employment, they slap on a complex, tax break on top of a mountain of disncentives. Presumably they then will remove this tax break, and pages 536,721 to 621,843 of the tax code describing it, despite the lobbying by large corporations who have figured out how to exploit it for billions of dollars, once the Brookings Institution decides that there is "enough" employment (!), and "policy-makers" no longer need to encourage it? 

How are the existing hundreds of bits of social engineering in the tax code working out? Do we really need more of this?  Isn't it time to return to a tax code that raises money for the government at minimal distortion?

The contrast between the benevolent "policy-maker" (no dictator ever had such power) and the reality of how the tax code in this country is actually enacted is pretty striking.

I have to say, I'm a bit disappointed in the end by both. They agree that the US economy is about 10 million jobs short. Something big is in the way. Lazear at least mentions some candidates, though many are long-standing. But the stirring conclusion from Lazear is only to continue a loose monetary policy that he says has been ineffective so far, and the conclusion from Blinder is the sort of clever scheme that economists cook up in late-night cocktail parties piling one more quickly-exploitable bit of social engineering on top of a tax code rife with them. Neither recommendation comes close to 10 million jobs, or addressing any sort of clear story why those jobs have vanished.

Debt and growth in 10 minutes

This is a short video from last year. I only just found out it exists. It still seems pretty topical, and (for once) condensed because Lars Hansen really forced me to obey the 10 minute time limit!

There is a better link here from the BFI page here that covers the whole event, but I couldn't figure out how to embed those.

Fun debt graphs

I was having a bit of fun making graphs for a talk. Are we all fine and debt is no longer a problem? I went back for a closer look at the CBO's long term budget outlook and The budget and economic outlook 2013 to 2023. All numbers from these sources.

 Above, I plot the CBO's long term outlook, in the alternative fiscal scenario (i.e. the one that is even faintly plausible).  As you can see, though they think the deficit gets better for a bit, then the entitlements disaster is still with us.

Of course, this will not happen, the only question is what adjusts.  If bond markets get a whiff that we actually will try these paths, we have a crisis on our hands.

So what can adjust? Revenue is historically about 20% of GDP no matter what tax rates are.  Doubling Federal revenue, while of course states, cities and counties keep taxing us, seems like an unlikely prospect. I'm all for cutting spending, but really, cutting spending in half, and by more than 20 percentage points of GDP? Well, it's in the Ryan budget, but it's a lot. So, what else can we do?

Answer: Growth. Tax revenue equals tax rate times income, and income equals todays income times growth. Greater growth makes all the difference.

To illustrate this point, I made a simple calculation. Suppose growth is 1% and then 2% greater than the CBO projects. What effect does that have? To keep it very simple, I assume that spending stays the same, and revenue stays the same fraction of GDP. Thus, I just divide spending/GDP by a 1% and then 2% growth rate (e^(0.01 t)) and we have the new spending as a fraction of the larger GDP.

This is pretty amazing, no? If we just had two percentage points GDP growth greater than the CBO's forecast (which is a bit above 2% in the out years) the whole budget would be solved without fixing anything.

This thought sent me back to look at the CBO's economic assumptions,

Uh-oh. The CBO thinks we are going to quickly enter a period of 4% growth, go back to trend, and then start growing smartly. Tax revenue = tax rate x income, that's a lot of revenue.  The CBO, the Fed, and everyone else (me too for a few years) has been forecasting this bounce back growth just around the corner for a while now. What if it doesn't happen, and 1.5% growth without catching up to trend is the new normal?

To keep it simple, I redid the above chart now just assuming 1% and 2% less growth than the CBO.

Is that Greece, or Cyprus?

So, the real budget news that could matter has little to do with tax rates or spending. What matters most of all is whether we break out of this sclerotic growth trap.

I found this graph pretty chilling as well: 

Really, what chance do you think there is that defense, nondefense discretionary and other mandatory spending will decrease form 4% of GDP to 2.5-3% of GDP in 10 years?

The net interest line is interesting. That's a huge rise. Why? Here are the other economic assumptions

You see the strong GDP growth, 4% for several years, in the top left panel. Inflation, bottom left, apparently has nothing to do with deficits, the Phillips Curve is alive and well.

But, the CBO is projecting interest rates to rise sharply in 2016, back to a low-normal 4% 3 month and 5% 5 year rate. This causes the $850 billion a year in interest costs highlighted in the previous graph, about the same numbers I was bandying about in "Monetary Policy with Large Debts" when worrying whether the Fed could actually do that to deficits.

From the deficit view, a Japanese lost decade of low interest rates would keep this from happening (or postpone it). Of course any financial event leading to higher interest rates would increase these interest payments a lot. 

Growth in the UK?

I thought European "austerity," meaning mostly large increases in marginal tax rates on anyone daring  to work, save, invest, start a company or hire people, while spending stays north of 50% of GDP, was a pretty bad idea.

So I was glad to read the tiltle, when a friend sent me a link to the Telegraph, announcing Osborne to unleash raft of policies to kick-start growth. Great, I thought, after trying everything else, the British will finally try the one thing that will work.


The byline was only a bit disappointing

The Government is to reveal a series of major new measures to boost national and regional growth ahead of the Budget to show its “pro-business” strategy is working

Pro-business is usually a code word for protection and subsidy. But there are plenty of worse code words.

And then it all falls apart

The measures will include:

• Billions of pounds of central government funding directed at boosting regional growth and a backing for Michael Heseltine’s plans for new local spending powers;

• The planning go-ahead for the Hinkley Point C nuclear power station;

• Support for housebuilders and for first-time buyers trying to get mortgages;

• A push on major infrastructure projects, including the Merseyside Gateway and the “super-sewer” in London, and more government guarantees for such projects;

... The Bank of England could also be given a broader mandate to support growth.

...billions of pounds of central government funds should be made directly available to the regions and cities such as Birmingham...

Lord Heseltine’s report made far-reaching recommendations for stimulating economic growth. The Government will unveil plans enabling Local Enterprise Partnerships and businesses to bid regionally for money that is now allocated centrally.

It's not all bad. Allowing a nuclear power plant to operate is nice, and some plans to lower corporate taxes a bit. But the blossoming of free enterprise in the land of Adam Smith, alas, this is not. Keynes still rules.  

GMO Salmon

Source: http://www.aquabounty.com

This weekend's New York Times brought the interesting story of AquaBounty's genetically modified salmon, which are genetically engineered to grow twice as fast as normal Salmon. A few choice bits:

"In 1993, the company approached the Food and Drug Administration about selling a genetically modified salmon that grew faster than normal fish. In 1995, AquaBounty formally applied for approval. Last month, more than 17 years later, the public comment period...was finally supposed to conclude. But the F.D.A. has extended the deadline...

Appropriately, it has been subjected to rigorous reviews... scientists, including the F.D.A.’s experts, have concluded that the fish is just as safe to eat as conventional salmon and that, raised in isolated tanks, it poses little risk to wild populations.

Why the delay?

... some suspect that political considerations have played a role in drawing the approval process out to tortuous lengths. Many of the members of Congress who oppose the modified fish represent states with strong salmon industries. And some nonprofit groups seem to be opposing the modified salmon reflexively, as part of an agenda to oppose all animal biotechnology, regardless of its safety or potential benefits.

Even the White House might be playing politics with the salmon. “The delay, sources within the government say, came after meetings with the White House, which was debating the political implications of approving the GM salmon, a move likely to infuriate a portion of its base.”

namely,

anti-biotech groups, which traffic in scare tactics rather than science...

This story brings three thoughts to mind.

1. So who is "anti-science?" I can't resist. There were a lot of potshots at Republicans for being anti-science, some well-deserved. But "science" is abundantly clear here. "Science" is indeed wrong at times, but if we want policy based on "science," the safety of GMO foods is about as good as it gets. There's plenty of magical thinking on both left and right, it turns out.

2.  $10,000 dollars invested in the stock market in 1993 is worth $50,000 today ($31,477 after inflation)  yes, even after the crash. It was already worth $37,600 ($32,700 after inflation) in 1999.  Remember, AcquaBounty hasn't sold a single fish. The cost of 20 years delay is enormous, amounting to a huge tax disincentive.

3. We need growth. Where does growth come from? Modern growth theory is abundantly clear. New ideas, new processes, new businesses that raise productivity. Like a new idea that lets us double the growth rate of farmed salmon. And, yes, lower profits of current salmon fishermen, much to the relief of wild salmon.

GMO foods are, potentially, a huge game changer. Once every 50 years or so, we bump up against a Malthusian limit, and a new idea frees us again. Fixing airborne nitrogen. Green revolution. Now, GMO foods. GMO plants are being bred to use less fertilizer and insecticide, i.e. to be better for the environment, as well as to cure vitamin A deficiency, produce less waste, and so on. No, dear Greenpeace, organic farming is not the answer, unless we use a lot more land for agriculture, starve out half the people, or believe in magic.  (It's too bad organizations like this suffer such mission creep. I would happily support their efforts on behalf of endangered species.)

Or maybe not. The lesson of industrial policy is that academic bloggers are just as bad as government bureaucrats in finding the next game changer. But there are hundreds of similar game-changers underway. Read any popular science magazine. Will we let the winners bear fruit?

Why do countries and civilizations fail? When interests vested in the status quo or magical thinking stop that process.  A long decay precedes the crises. I am reminded of the famous failures, such as the Chinese Emperor's ban on long-range shipping, at a time when Chinese ships were way better than Portugese.

Update: A very nice article by Henry Miller on GM foods, titled "Anti-Genetic Engineering Activism: Why the Bastards Never Quit." Henry is obviously much more knowledgeable than I am.

What's holding back the US economy?

This is a video I did with Steve Davis and Amir Sufi, moderated by Hal Weitzman, part of the new Chicago Booth "The Big Question" series. Youtube link here. I'm actually a lot calmer through most of it than I appear in the cover shot.

The Times on Taxes

The New York Times' Sunday lead editorial (12/30) is simply breathtaking. The title is "Why the economy needs tax reform." It starts well,

Over the next four years, tax reform, done right, could be a cure for much of what ails the economy...

OK, say I, the sun is out, the birds are chirping, my coffee is hot, and for once I'm going to read a sensible editorial from the Times, pointing out what we all agree on, that our tax system is horrendously chaotic, corrupt, and badly in need of reform. Let's go -- lower marginal rates, broaden the base, simplify the code.

That mood lasts all of one sentence.

Higher taxes,...

Words matter. "Reform" twice, followed by paragraphs of "higher taxes," with no actual "reform" in sight. The Times is embarking on an Orwellian mission to appropriate the word "reform" to mean "higher taxes" not "fix the system."

Let's be specific. What is the Times' idea of tax "reform?"

tax capital gains at the same rates as ordinary income.... a restoration of the estate tax, higher tax rates or surcharges on multimillion-dollar incomes, and higher corporate taxes..

That's just to get started. Since, as the Times refreshingly admits,

..the new revenue would only slow the growth of the debt in the near term..

before the health care entitlement deluge hits,

... Mr. Obama would be wise to instruct the Treasury Department to start work on tax reform now, exploring carbon taxes, both to raise revenue and to protect the environment; a value-added tax,... and a financial transactions tax...

That's "reform?"

What will all those taxes do? The Times has a little bit of deficit reduction on its mind,

 More revenue would also reduce budget deficits, helping to put the nation’s finances on a stable path.

But with "reduce," "help," and "stable path," you can tell that eliminating deficits and paying off the debt are not a real high priority here. The Times has bigger fish to fry, starting with a red herring and ending with a red whale.

Higher taxes, raised progressively, could encourage growth by helping to pay for long-neglected public investment in education, infrastructure and basic research...

We've been spending more and more on education for years. While performance steadily declines. The trouble with schools is not lack of money.

Yes, infrastructure is crumbling, as a few New Yorkers may have figured out when their power went off, while their politicians -- and the Times -- instead of talking about burying electric lines and putting in a modern grid, wished instead to stem the rise of oceans and sugar in their soft drinks. But infrastructure spending is a tiny component of the Federal budget; we could support anyone's wish list without a Federal income tax.  Basic research spending could be doubled on about 10 minutes worth of Federal spending. Red herring.

The whale comes last:

Greater progressivity would reduce rising income inequality, and with it, inequality of opportunity that is both an economic and social scourge. 

The Times is arguing forthrightly for confiscatory taxation of income and wealth, in order simply to  reduce post-tax incomes. This isn't "redistribution," it's "off with their heads!"

Inequality of opportunity? No, President Obama's kids should not go to Sidwell Friends, they should go to DC public schools like everyone else?  Mayor Rahm Emanuel's kids shouldn't go to the University of Chicago Lab school (mine go there too, but I don't preach this stuff), they should have to go to Chicago public schools like everyone else? These are "economic and social advantages" arising from unequal income. Big ones, that motivate a lot of parents to work hard so they can afford the tuition.  French President Francois Hollande has a better idea: ban homework, so kids with smart parents can't get an advantage because they get help on homework. Too bad you can't ban homework in China and India. No concierge medicine either. Stand in line for medicaid like the rest of us.

And to accomplish this leveling, we'll just take money from "the rich" until all are equally impoverished.

Am I being alarmist? No. Read the sentence again, carefully. Words matter. What else can it possibly mean?

It's just astounding. When has a society ever grown, become prosperous, and raised opportunities for its citizens--of any background--by confiscatory taxation, transferring wealth to the State, with the deliberate aim of reducing the opportunities of a segment of its population? The examples I can think of -- French and Russian revolutions, the whole communist world -- ended rather badly.  Even more modest attempts, say postwar Britain, do not augur well. The evidence of Europe's current high-tax "austerity" (another word Orwellianly appropriated to mean "high taxes") and the weight of academic research (most recently from the IMF and Alberto Alesina) stand before us: Fiscal retrenchment led by higher marginal tax rates simply does not work.

Moving from outcome to opportunity, as the Times does, when has a society ever accomplished equal and plentiful opportunities by confiscatory taxation and heavy regulation? I can think of lots of societies that by these means became much less equal, with opportunity dependent on political and family connections, and thus out of reach of even the most talented and industrious people without connections. 

What of us naysayers? On taxing "capital gains at the same rate as ordinary income,"  

That is an indefensible giveaway to the richest Americans. Research shows that the tax breaks do not add to economic growth but do contribute to inequality. Currently, the top 1 percent of taxpayers receive more than 70 percent of all capital gains, while the bottom 80 percent receive only 6 percent.

Three more fish and a whopper.

We might start with the interesting assertion that any tax rate is a "giveaway." Who gives what to whom, dear Times?

"Research shows" is another fascinating choice of words.  "Research shows" means "all research shows," or "the consensus of research shows," without actually saying it. The facts are "some research shows," or in this case, really, "two unpublished papers we found on the web claim."

The links point to a report by the Congressional Research service and a one-page screed from the Urban Institute.  Both pieces of "research" simply plot the usual pointless correlations ignoring the hundreds of other causes, effects, and things not held constant. Aspirin causes colds you know: Look, there is a strong correlation between asprin-taking and colds. Neither one is even submitted let alone published in a refereed journal, which is no guarantee of anything but at least it's the minimum standard for "research." If this were indeed what constitutes "research,"  and "science,"  vast new funding for fundamental research in economics might well be warranted.

Fortunately, that is not the case.  What real research concludes, as much as anything in economics concludes, is that capital gains taxes are about the easiest to avoid (see Buffett, Warren).  Real research shows that when capital gains rates were reduced in the 1980s, revenue increased. Real public finance, the rest of the world's tax systems, and the broad conclusion of just about everybody until the world lost its head in 2008, was that capital gains taxation is a bad idea.

And the whale: "Receive" capital gains? Dear Times, capital gains are not a check sent by great-grandma's trust fund. Let me educate you on where capital gains come from: People work, and earn money, and pay taxes on that money.  Rather than blow it all stimulating consumption demand, they save some of it, invest in stocks, or start businesses. When those investments pay off, they sell, and receive capital gains. A vast swath of retirees lives off capital gains, especially from their houses.Small business owners are "high income" in the one year they sell their businesses.

Words matter, again. "Receive" paints capital gains as passive receipts form a mysterious ill-gotten mountain of gold, ripe for plucking with neither tax avoidance, behavioral change, or economic consequence. That's just not how our world works, but very revealing of the Times' zero-sum, class-warfare worldview.

What about 

...higher corporate taxes..

Once again, one of the few things real "research shows," and  economists agree on pretty heartily, is that corporate taxation -- already higher in the US than the rest of the world -- is a silly idea. All corporate taxes are passed on to people, through higher prices, lower wages, or lower returns to investors, primarily the former two. Tax people when they get the money. And corporations are much better at evasion, lobbying, moving abroad, and structuring operation in silly ways to avoid taxes.

The value added tax -- the economist's favorite, if coupled with elimination of other taxes -- is famously "regressive," the modern term (here are those important little words again) for "everybody pays the same rate."  Value added is, in Europe (along with 30-40% payroll taxes) the middle class tax that pays for middle class benefits. What about that, dear Times?

a value-added tax, coupled with provisions to protect lower-income taxpayers from higher prices, to tax consumption and encourage saving;

This is just incoherent. If you're "protected from higher prices," you're not paying the tax. If we couple the VAT with a vast new income transfer program, adieu revenues.

At least we close with some humor. The VAT is there to encourage saving, while heavy taxation of interest, dividends, capital gains and estates, says just the opposite.

What about spending?

The big obstacle to comprehensive tax reform is the persistent Republican myth that spending cuts alone can achieve economic and budget goals. That notion was sounded rejected by voters during the election. Yet it still has adherents among many Republicans, which will make it that much harder for Congress to grapple with the bigger and more complex issue at the heart of tax reform: how to pay for government in the 21st century.

....All that [long list of taxes] would only be a start, because the new revenue would only slow the growth of the debt in the near term. After 10 years, the pressures of an aging population and health care costs would cause the debt to accelerate again.

Oh those evil Republicans, standing against "reform," and reusing to grapple with "how to pay for government." The size and scope of which is not under discussion. No, dear Times, it's not "the pressures of  an aging population and health care costs." It is the Federal Government's promises to pay for it all. Which are, apparently, fixed stars.

Technical regress in any area is sad. Once upon a time, when we talked about taxes, there was a modicum of economics involved. When we thought about raising or lowering a rate, we thought seriously about the inevitable avoidance and distortions.  The first question was, "if we pass this law, will x actually pay more money, or will he simply change behavior to avoid the tax?" The second question was, "will his change in behavior hurt the economy?" Before we talk about what's "fair" we talked about "what works."

And we knew the sign of the answer: distorting taxation raises less revenue than you think, and reduces economic prosperity. The only question is how much. We did not indulge in magical thinking that appropriating anyone's income would actually improve the economy, all on its own. We understood the damage, and tried to carefully balance the benefits of spending against that damage. This is how we got, for a while, to low marginal rates with a broad base (the latter since loopholed away), low capital gains, estate, and corporate taxes, and were headed messily towards a system that taxed consumption more than rates of return. 

As one glorious counterexample of all the Times' monstrous confusions:

a financial transactions tax, to ensure that the financial sector, whose profits have substantially outpaced those of nonfinancial corporations, pay a fair share

A transactions tax is the easiest thing in the world to avoid with financial engineering.  How do you begin to figure out the "fair share" that financial vs nonfinancial corporations should pay? How about mutual funds whose beneficiaries are impoverished union schoolteachers? 

Orwellian language, blatant mistruths, and magical thinking aside, however, I want to applaud this editorial. No, I'm not kidding.

The Times is saying, out loud, that if we are to have the regulatory and welfare state we have enacted, it must be paid for with huge middle class taxes, as well as confiscatory taxes on anyone who dares to save, invest, or start a business. This is refreshing honesty. Up until about November 3, all we heard from them is that reversing the Bush tax cuts on the rich would pay for it all. At least a few of its readers may wake up and say, "wait, we voted for this?"

Really, my main complaint is that they left out the "if," and its logical consequence, and any doubts that raising tax rates so massively might not produce the needed long-run revenue growth they hope for.

It is a mistake to dismiss this clear editorial. This isn't the Village voice, or the Berkeley Free Press. This is the New York Times. This is how a wide swath of our fellow citizens, and majority of our fellow voters, see the world.   This is the agenda. They could not have been clearer if they had said "first we annex Austria and move against Czechoslovakia. Then we invade Poland and swing North and West." Heed them.

Two views of debt and stagnation

Two new papers on economic stagnation in periods of high government debt (i.e. now) are making a splash: 

Public Debt Overhangs by Carmen  Reinhart,Vincent Reinhart and Ken Rogoff
The Output Effect of Fiscal Consolidations by Alberto Alesina, Carlo Favero and Francesco Giavazzi

This review is mostly about the former, with a little mention of the latter (maybe I'll get back to that later)

The Reinharts and Rogoff look at episodes in which government debt crossed 90% of GDP. They have two big conclusions: the episodes lasted  a long time, "...among the 26 episodes we identify, 20 lasted more than a decade," and those episodes are associated with slow growth: "the vast majority of high debt episodes—23 of the 26— coincide with substantially slower growth."

They want very much to conclude that high debt causes the slow growth, referring to "growth-reducing effects of high public debt." But as always in economics, correlation is not causation, which they recognize:

But obvious concerns arise here about cause and effect. Is the public debt overhang causing the slower growth? Or is an exogenous shock that causes slower growth either helping to generate the public debt overhang or else prolonging the escape from that debt overhang?

Evidence? Well, the debt episodes last a long time

The long length of typical public debt overhang episodes suggests that even if such episodes are originally caused by a traumatic event such as a war or financial crisis, they can take on a self-propelling character...

 The long duration belies the view that the correlation [high debt with low growth] is caused mainly by debt buildups during business cycle recessions. ...

No, alas. This makes a pretty good first-year exam question: write down a model in which income is completely exogenous (unrelated to debt levels) yet once a country crosses 90% debt/GDP it takes decades to repay, and growth is slower conditional on high debt. (Hint: Use the permanent income model. Countries get in debt when they have bad income shocks. Debt has a unit root in that model, so debt excursions are never expected to revert.  It does take "growth fluctuations" that are beyond "cyclical," but those do exist, even without high debt.)

Ok, well,

This endogeneity conundrum has not been fully resolved. However, a number of recent studies have tackled the problem. .... [they] have concluded that the relationship cannot be entirely from low growth to high debt, and that very high debt likely does weigh on growth.

Oh, great. "Studies." Yet, as I read the review of the "studies," they are the usual sort of growth regressions or instruments, hardly decisive of causality.

I shouldn't be too hard, because I agree with the conclusion (high debt is likely to cause low growth). I'm just picky about the logic. But for a reason.

What's missing? A mechanism. To discuss cause and effect sensibly we have think about the plausible mechanism is. Regressions can too easily conclude that since rich guys drive BMWs, all you need to do is drive a BMW and you'll get rich.

And clearly, debt by itself doesn't matter -- it's how debt leads to other economic events that matters.

This is to me a frustrating feature of Reinhart and Rogoff's earlier work. Recessions after financial crises are typically longer (usually misquoted as "always.") Ok, but why? Because governments follow policies after financial crises that screw up economies for a long time (distorting taxes, wealth transfers, propping up zombie financial institutions)? Because of "private debt overhang" that would be cured by a massive transfer from savers to borrowers? (Not my favorite theory, but popular around the lunchroom so I'll mention it.)  Because the destruction of property rights in bailouts freezes new investment?  Their work is quoted as a mysterious fact of nature about which nothing can be done.

Here, Reinharts and Rogoff do mention some mechanisms

The first channel operates through a quantity effect on private sector investment and savings. When public debt is very high, it will tend to soak up the available investment funds and thus to crowd out private investment. If the government at the same time is imposing policies that attempt to reduce its debt burden with higher taxes, a burst of unexpected inflation, or various types of financial repression, then investment may well be discouraged further.

The first mechanism seems to me to confuse debt with deficits. The second one rings true: high debts correspond to high taxes (really high tax rates), wealth expropriation, and other big drags on investment. Financial repression is an under-reported issue:

In addition, governments in the second half of the twentieth century often used policies of “financial repression” to reduce the cost of the public debt, by limiting capital flows and regulating financial institutions in such a way that alternative investments were blocked and financing for government debt would flow more cheaply.

See Banks, comma, European. And given the detailed control that Dodd-Frank gives to US regulators, I can see "gee, we didn't see you at the Treasury Auction. Should we send some inspectors down to look at the books?" coming to a bank near you soon.

The second channel involves a rising risk premium on the interest rates for government debt. Sufficiently high levels of public debt call into question whether the debt will be repaid in full, and can thus lead to a higher risk premia and its associated higher long-term real interest rates, which in turn has negative implications for investment as well as for consumption of durables and other interest-sensitive sectors, such as housing. 

This makes less sense by itself. Why should a risk premium on government debt matter to private investment?  Well, because we can all see that an indebted government is going to tax away private businesses... but we already talked about that.

A mechanism could let us sort out cause and effect. We can see distorting taxation, financial repression, property rights destruction in defaults, inflation, and see which paths following high debt make growth better or worse.  (Many PhD theses here!)

And, more importantly, the correlation is really pretty useless until we figure out which mechanism is at work.

RRR's Conclusions:

This paper should not be interpreted as a manifesto for rapid public debt deleveraging
exclusively via fiscal austerity in an environment of high unemployment.

OK, but I find this annoyingly misleading. Why sign on to the deliberately obfuscation induced by current political use of the word "austerity"? Cutting spending is a lot different from raising marginal tax rates. "Unemployment" sounds like an endorsement of short-term Keynesian stimulus, which must be the one thing that clearly doesn't work in their data once debt gets to 90% of GDP.

Alesina and company make this clear:

Adjustments based upon spending cuts are much less costly in terms of output losses than tax-based ones. Spending-based adjustments have been associated with mild and short-lived recessions, in many cases with no recession at all. Tax-based adjustments have been associated with prolonged and deep recessions. 

Here we have in a nutshell my frustration with the Reinhart-Rogoff paper. There is a causal mechanism staring us in the face -- high taxes, prospective wealth confiscation (and financial repression) kill growth. Yet, they want to make "debt" the culprit, not really looking at the causal mechanisms in any detail. Why are they not just a big data set for Alesina and co's conclusions?  Back to RRR:

Our review of historical experience also highlights that, apart from outcomes of full or selective default on public debt, there are other strategies to address public debt overhang including debt restructuring and a plethora of debt conversions (voluntary and otherwise). 

Now you get the agenda and weak discussion of causal mechanisms. If "debt" is the problem, the answer is obvious: default or inflate it away. "Restructuring" and "conversions" are nice words for default.

But the case for default is not, in fact, made anywhere in the "review of historical experience" in this paper. Serial defaulters in their data do not have higher growth rates. Paying it back worked out OK for Alexander Hamilton. The Soviet Union was inaugurated the opposite way with a big default. If washing your hands of debts is such a good idea, it's interesting that so many governments go to such lengths to avoid it.

Where is the option, liberalize your economy, and grow out of it? They dismiss the one great data point that goes against the trend, the UK paying off Napoleonic war debt, thus,

there were substantial transfers from the colonies to finance debts and facilitate debt reduction...With the exception of the United Kingdom at the height of its colonial powers in the nineteenth century,

So forget  free markets, industrial revolution, railroads and all that -- England just taxed colonies like ancient Rome?

Speaking of the 19th century

In those days before fiat currency, inflation was not as prevalent as it would later become. Thus, the “liquidation” of government debt via a steady stream of negative real interest rates was not as easily accomplished in the days of the gold standard and relatively free international capital mobility as in the decades after World War II.

This sounds like a bad thing!

Yeah, default sounds great ex-post. But it is the precommitment against default ex-post that lets you borrow ex-ante. To say nothing of the chaos a large-scale sovereign default or inflation in the US and Europe would cause. Not so easy.

I don't mean to sound one-sided on this. I've been advocating Greek default for a while, at least while the original bond holders still held some of the debt. (Too late now). I'd still rather see us all  liberalize, grow, and pay it off. I'd rather see governments cut spending, as I see that paying it off by confiscatory wealth taxes will lead to a big no growth data point. Default is only a little better than that option. But let's face up to the costs of default, not just how nice it will be to wipe out the debt.

However, the evidence, as we read it, casts doubt on the view that soaring government debt does not matter when markets (and official players, notably central banks) seem willing to absorb it at low interest rates—as is the case for now.

I'm glad to end on a note of total agreement. "As is the case for now" only applies to some countries -- ask a Greek friend!

Gordon on Growth

Bob Gordon is making a big splash with a new paper, Is US Growth Over?

Gordon's paper is about the biggest and most important economic question of all: Long-run growth. It's easy to forget that per-capita income, the overall standard of living, only started to increase steadily in about 1750. The Roman empire lasted centuries, but the average person at the end of it did not live better than at the beginning.

Gordon's Figure 1, reproduced here shows how growth picked up in the mid 1700s, reached 2.5% per year -- which made us dramatically better off than our great-grandparents -- and now seems to be tailing off.

As Bob reminds us with colorful vignettes of 18th and 19th century living, nothing, but nothing, is more important to economic well being than long-run growth.

And modern growth economics is pretty clear on where the goose is that lays this golden egg: Innovation. New ideas, embodied in new products, processes and businesses. For example, see Bob Lucas' "Ideas and Growth" which starts

What is it about modern capitalist economies that allows them, in contrast to all earlier societies, to generate sustained growth in productivity and living standards? It is widely agreed that the productivity growth of the industrialized economies is mainly an ongoing intellectual achievement, a sustained flow of new ideas

Growth theory neatly divides economics into "growth effects," which is really how fast new ideas are born and implemented, versus "level effects." Many economic distortions screw up the level, making an area or a country less well off than its neighbors. But so long as the frontier keeps growing, even level effects only retard a country a few decades.

Here's a picture. The red line represents 2% growth (real, per capita), starting at $100,000 income. By 2100 your great grandchildren are earning $738,000. The blue line shows a "level effect." Suppose some set of harebraned policies is so awful that it reduces the level of GDP by 20% -- but does not interfere with the growth mechanism. It's pretty bad. But the blue line is really just shifted to the right, lagging a decade or so behind but still participating in the eventual miracle.

By contrast, the black line says, what if there is a policy or change in the environment that has no effect on the level of GDP, but lowers the long-run growth rate to 1%. 2%, 1%, what's the difference? Cumulate that over a century, and your great grandchildren make $300,000, not $738,000.

OK, so, to Bob's first thesis: Long-run growth is slowing down. The big ideas of the first two industrial revolutions, roughly the harnessing of energy, urbanization, clean water, have been used as far as they can. The computer revolution, to Bob, seems to running out of its ability to raise productivity. 20-somethings updating their facebook profiles instead of paying attention class are not the jet-packs and rocket ships we thought we were going to have by 2001.

I think Bob has the right question here. And his warning is well-taken. Just because growth has been steady does not mean it's assured. The "trend" does not come for free. Each improvement in productivity takes hard work, and disruptive new companies putting established incumbents out to pasture.

But I think  -- or at least I hope -- he has the wrong answer (and he freely admits this is speculative).

My pet theory is that the real defining innovation of growth was Gutenberg. Science gives us real knowledge, at last, by controlled experimentation. But controlled experimentation is extraordinarily expensive.  A farmer can't afford to test which crops grow best, a country doctor can't do clinical trials. For society to gain knowledge by scientific method, we need communication. One doctor's clinical trials inform another doctor's practice a thousand miles away. Gutenberg made that possible.

More generally, the process of growth, of incorporating new ideas into the economy, almost always represents standing on the shoulders of giants, appropriating, slightly improving, and implementing someone else's ideas. That, for example, is why we see clusters of innovation such as Silicon Valley.

Well, if Gutenberg (and subsequent innovations that used his ideas, the newspaper, the scientific journal, and the public library) lowered the costs of communicating ideas and widened the community of people that a given idea could reach, the internet just did that tenfold. As I look at the cool stuff -- nanotechnology, genetic engineering etc. -- underway and the instant worldwide communication of ideas, I have hope we'll see that 2.5 percent again. If we let the process run.

For example, think how Bob's idea got to your desk. When I was a young economist, before the internet, he would have mailed a paper to the NBER, a month or two later the working paper would have been distributed. The internet buzz I saw that got me to go look at it would have taken a few more months to percolate to me by older information networks, then I'd have to go read it in the library. Finally, who knows how I would have gotten to you. That all happened in a week. The diffusion of ideas is on steroids.

Well, maybe my pet theory is wrong. Still, long-run growth is the issue,  it is not guaranteed but hard-won,  we didn't always have it and we could lose it, and that would be a catastrophe.  

Bob prognosticates not only that we seem to have run out of productivity-increasing ideas, but that "six headwinds" stand in the way. His headwinds are 1) Demographics: aging and reduced labor-force participation 2) Plateau in US educational attainment 3) "The most important quantitatively in holding down the growth of our future income is rising inequality." 4) Globalization and outsourcing 5) Energy and enviroment 6)  Household and government debt.

Here I think Bob is mostly confusing "level" effects with "growth" effects.  He is also mixing constraints -- run out of ideas -- with self-inflicted wounds -- dysfunctional public education, refusing to let in immigrants, refusing to use nuclear power or GM foods.  And, I don't see how he can focus on the US. Suppose we cede the frontier to, say, China, as the UK ceded the frontier to us in Bob's graph. But as long as we still use China's ideas and technology, and they grow at 2.5 percent, so do we.

The optimistic lesson of growth theory is that, no matter how badly you screw up level effects, growth will bail you out eventually. So, any "headwinds" need to be clearly linked to the possibility that economic distortions lower the rate of finding new ideas and incorporating them. The whole point of growth theory is that, in the long run, that's all that matters.

Do they? My impression of modern growth theory is that the economics of innovation production and adoption are not well understood. Do the distortions of a high-tax,  regulated, crony-capitalist, welfare state,  just screw up levels? Or do they  reduce the spread of ideas behind long-run growth? My fear is "yes."

In any case, just posing the question this way argues that the dangerous "headwinds" are entirely different from the ones that Bob highlights. The returns from innovation, starting new companies, introducing new products and processes -- and in that process making established incumbents very unhappy -- are the most likely targets.

But it's also clear that ideas are public goods, or high fixed cost zero marginal cost goods. Their production and diffusion depends a lot on non-market structures, like, say, universities. (Don't jump from that observation to "they need to be subsidized," as it it's all to easy to subsidize bad ideas too.) That's another lesson of Bob Lucas' paper, which is remarkably free of economic incentives.

Finally, a warning about statistics. Here is my last picture, blown up.

As you can see, if you're just looking at GDP trends, it's hard to tell a "level" effect from a "growth" effect for several decades.

Much discussion of our current slump presumes it's a temporary "level" shock; the blue line will go back up quickly to the red line. The "stagnation" hypothesis is that we're on the blue line -- we lost about 5% of GDP in the recession, and now we're on the growth path with a lower level. That's disastrous enough. Bob warns us that we might be on the worst of the blue and black lines. That would be a huge disaster.

All said before.  The graph reminds us is that it takes a long time to figure out which it is based on just eyeballing the GDP or productivity data. We have to think. Which Bob is prodding us to do.

Inevitable slow recoveries?

The economy is stuck in slow growth, not the fast growth we should see after a steep recession. (See previous post here, as well as John Taylor on the subject)

But we've heard the defense over and over again: "recoveries are always slower after financial crises."  Most recently (this is what set me off today) in the Washington Times,

Many economists say the agonizing recovery from the Great Recession...is the predictable consequence of a housing market collapse and a grave financial crisis. ... any recovery was destined to be a slog.

“A housing collapse is very different from a stock market bubble and crash,” said Nobel Prize-winning economist Peter Diamond of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. “It affects so many people. It only corrects very slowly.”

This argument has been batted back and forth, but a new angle occurred to me: If it was so obvious that this recovery would be slow, then the Administration's forecasts should have reflected it.  Were they saying at the time, "normally, the economy bounces back quickly after deep recessions, but it's destined to be slow this time, because recoveries from housing "bubbles" and financial crises are always slow?"

No, as it turns out. I went back to the historical Administration Budget proposals and found the "Economic Assumptions" in each year's "Analytical Perspectives." This gives the Administration's forecast at the time.

Here is actual real GDP (black line) together with the Administration's forceasts (blue lines). The red line is the current blue chip consensus (also as reported in the budget), which I'll get to in a minute.

As you can see, there is nothing like an inevitable, forecastable, natural, slow recovery from a financial crisis or "housing bubble" in the administration's forecasts.

Their forecasts at the time look just like my quick bounce-back-to-the trend line that you see in my previous posts, and John Taylor's, and lots of others'. And they are surprised each year that the fast recovery doesn't happen.



Here is the same information in growth rates:

Here you see that each year the Administration was forecasting  that within a year the economy would experience a sustained period of strong, 4% or more, "catchup growth" until it gets back to trend.  And each year they have been disappointed.

So, if a slow recovery is the inevitable result of a financial crisis, why was the Administration forecasting the "normal" fast recovery all along?

The natural conclusion is that the administration thought, as I thought, that the economy should have grown quickly, as it typically has in the past. The "slow growth after financial crises" isn't a fact in the first place. And to the extent that it is a fact (it's a "fact" over a sample of countries not very representative of the US now), slow growth is not the inevitable result of a financial crisis itself, but a result of the mismanaged policy that typically follows a financial crisis, such as bailouts, close-the-barn-door-after-the-horse leaves banking regulation, trampling of property rights that scare creditors away, high taxes and so forth. After all, there isn't any economic theory of this "natural" slowness.

Browsing around the budgets, I found they had made the case even more convincingly than I have. Here are two graphs from the 2010 budget (p. 176, p. 181)

The Administration expected strong growth, financial crisis or no financial crisis. In fact they're a bit defensive that they expect stronger growth than the blue chips.

And the 2012 budget contains this beauty

Along with a lovely explanation

Some international economic organizations have argued that a financial recession permanently scars an economy, and this view is also shared by some American forecasters. On that view, there is no reason to expect a full recovery to the previous trend of real GDP. The statistical evidence for permanent scarring comes mostly from the experiences of developing countries and its relevance to the current situation in the United States is debatable. Historically, economic growth in the United States economy has shown considerable stability over time as displayed in Chart 2-7. Since the late 19th century, following every recession, the economy has returned to the long-term trend in per capita real GDP. This was true even following the only previous recession in which the United States experienced a disastrous financial crisis – 1929-1933 – although the recovery from the Great Depression was not complete until World War II restored demand. The U.S. economy has enormous room for growth, although there are factors that could continue to limit that growth in the years ahead.

Ok, except for that silly bit about how great WWII was, (almost echoing Paul Krugman's idea that the key to prosperity is for the government to fake an alien invasion) we seem agreed.

So, the natural conclusion is, what are these "factors" that "continue to limit growth?" If the patient should naturally recover quickly on his own, as every time in the past, perhaps, just perhaps, too much doctoring is to blame?

Now, the red line, the blue chip consensus forecast. The administration's forecast is quite a bit above the blue chips. As it was throughout. A natural interpretation is that this is the usual "rosy scenario" used to make budgets look better. Possible, but I prefer the interpretation that these are honest forecasts, reflecting the natural and correct idea that the economy should spring back quickly from deep recessions, no matter whether associated with more or less financial turmoil.  Really, it make no sense that they knew they were in for 3 years of horrible growth and joblessnes, but just kept putting out ridiculously optimistic forecasts, which they knew would be wrong.

The blue chips could simply be reflecting a more cynical (or in my view, realistic) effect of how bad the Administration's policies would be for growth and recovery. They are supposed to be forecasts of how the economy will behave given policy, not it's "natural tendencies."

The mismeasure of inequality

Kip Hagopian and Lee Ohanian have a wonderful new policy review titled "the mismeasurement of inequality."  Calmly, and with careful grounding in facts and review of research, it destroys most of the current liberal myths about the amount of inequality and its importance. The promise:

We will show that much of what has been reported about income inequality is misleading, factually incorrect, or of little or no consequence to our economic well-being. We will also show that middle-class incomes are not stagnating; in fact, middle-class incomes have risen significantly over the 29 years covered by the cbo study. Lastly, we will address assertions that the rich are not paying their “fair share” of taxes

"Address" should be "destroy", but they're being careful. Some nuggets:


Standard measures of inequality are based on pretax cash income, ignoring transfer payments from the government, goods provided directly (housing), benefits (health insurance, retirement contributions), all home-produced goods, and focus on income rather than consumption, which is often suspiciously higher than reported income.  Kip and Lee do their best. When done, the increase in inequality disappears.

Looking at consumption (though still imperfect, as it leaves out home production) yields surprising results:

In 1960–61 consumption expenditures in the lowest quartile were 112 percent of reported income, rising to 140 percent (in the lowest quintile) in 1972–73, and 198 percent (in the lowest quintile) in 2005. Thus, a family claiming $22,300 in income in 2005 would have reported about $44,000 in expenditures in that year. ... the gap between reported income and consumption is filled by various categories of government transfer payments (including Medicaid, food stamps, subsidized housing, the Earned Income Tax Credit, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, etc.), family savings, imputed income from owner-occupied housing, barter, support from family and friends, and income from the underground economy.

The poor did not get poorer, or stagnate.

..on average America’s poor live in housing that totals 515 square feet per person, about 40 percent more per person than the living quarters of the average European household. (The average American household lives in about 845 square feet per person, or 2.3 times the average European household.)

In addition to food, clothing, and shelter, some of the most meaningful indicators of well-being are the properties and amenities that make life more comfortable or enjoyable. Based on data from the 2009 “American Housing Survey,” Rector and Sheffield report that 42 percent of poor households own a home (median price: $100,000); 80 percent have air conditioning; 98 percent have a color tv (65 percent have two or more); 99.6 percent have a refrigerator; 98 percent have a stove and oven; 75 percent have a car or truck (31 percent have two or more); 81 percent have a microwave oven; 78 percent have a dvd or vcr; 64 percent have a satellite connection; and 25 percent have a dishwasher. 

Our purpose is not to make light of the deprivations the poor suffer every day. [My emphasis. Liberals always try to say "you don't care" because you don't want to swallow the latest scheme.]  There is no doubt that the poorest Americans struggle mightily, and that too many Americans are poor. But these data are useful in understanding the difficulties in defining poverty, and for constructing effective policies aimed at helping those in need

Since "are we becoming Europe?" and "how bad is that really?" are often in the news, a fact based comparison is interesting

...the U.S. has a significantly higher standard of living than almost all of the most advanced economies. According to “The Luxembourg Wealth Study,” the data source used by the oecd for international comparisons, in 2002 (the latest year for which results were available), median disposable personal income in the U.S., adjusted to reflect purchasing power parity, was 19.3 percent higher than in Canada; 68 percent higher than in Finland; 45 percent higher than in Germany; 59 percent higher than in Italy; 31 percent higher than in Norway; 73 percent higher than in Sweden; and 31 percent higher than in the United Kingdom.

 Europe doesn't look so bad when you go visit? Answer: averages matter. Not every body lives on the Via Veneto, dear tourist.

The figures for gdp per capita and median income understate America’s economic performance advantage because the median age of the U.S. population (36.8 years) is about four years lower than the average median age in the European Union and almost eight years lower than in Japan. Age, as a proxy for experience, is a significant contributor to income until individual earnings peak sometime between age 50 and 55. 

A good point I hadn't thought of.

Taxes, and "fair share"?

The U.S. income tax system is, by any measure, quite progressive. In fact, according to a study released in 2008 by the oecd, the U.S. federal income tax system is the most progressive of any of the 24 countries in the “oecd-24,” which includes Canada, Japan, Australia, and all of the richest European nations: Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, Luxembourg, and Sweden. In fact, the U.S. progressivity index is 22 percent higher than the average for the 24 countries...

In addition to economic efficiency considerations, we believe that taxing any income from savings and investment is inequitable. Here’s why: Assume two people, Angelina and Brad, have exactly the same lifetime earned income, but Angelina saves ten percent of her after-tax income and Brad saves nothing. In this hypothetical, if income from savings is taxed, Angelina will pay more lifetime tax than Brad, simply because Angelina saved. We believe this is clearly inequitable.

Angelina will also get a lot fewer government benefits. She'll pay more college tuition, get less out of social security, have all her subsequent income taxed at higher marginal rates, and so on. (Investment income may not be taxed that highly iteslf, but it pushes you into a high adjusted gross income bracket and then makes your other income subject to more taxation.)

So what is a “fair share”? The U.S. tax system is more progressive than that of any other advanced economy. Higher-income workers already pay a substantially disproportionate amount of the income tax relative to their share of income. The top five percent pay 44 percent more in taxes than the bottom 95 percent, while 47 percent of tax filers pay no tax at all. The bottom 50 percent of filers pay only 2.3 percent of taxes, and the bottom quintile gets money back. Based on these facts, how does one make a case that the rich are not paying their fair share?

OK, as they admit, nobody has defined "fair," still well written.

I prefer cause and effect, positive analysis. Will redistribution through taxation make us better off, or consign us to egaliatrian misery? I want to raise the living standards of less well off Americans every bit as much as my lefty colleagues. Will redistribution help them or leave them worse off?

We are unaware of persuasive evidence that reducing income inequality will increase economic well-being for the majority of citizens; in fact, America’s superior standard of living and economic growth relative to other advanced economies is evidence to the contrary. 

For arguably the most commonly used measure of inequality and for the Census Bureau’s most comprehensive definition of income, inequality has not risen since 1993. Moreover, the rise in income inequality that occurred before that year appears to have been, at least in part, a byproduct of the remarkable success of a group of entrepreneurs who in the past few decades created countless jobs and contributed substantially to the higher living standards we all currently enjoy. ..

A final cheer:

Rather than focusing on income inequality, policymakers should address the very real impediments to achieving equality of opportunity, particularly for the youngest and least-skilled workers among us. We believe such efforts should begin with fixing our k-12 education system, which is failing to train many young Americans to be competitive in today’s global labor market. If we can solve this problem, we will enable future generations of young people to climb the economic ladder and achieve the economic success that has long made the United States the world’s leading economy

Yes. What the public education system in this country has done to the poor and less well off is a scandal (I don't like the term "middle class," as I reject the idea that we are a class-based society).

I'm not doing justice to the careful argument in the report. Go read the original

Just how bad is the economy?

The second-quarter GDP numbers came out. The newspapers and Republicans pounced on low growth and anemic job growth. The Democrats rebut growth is growth and tell us of the steady job gains. How bad is the economy?

Economists know that levels matter, and that long-run growth matters more than anything else. I made a few graphs to emphasize these points.

Start with the level (in logs) of real GDP. (This is an update of a graph I saw on John Taylor's blog.)

Looking at levels you see the current awfulness better than by looking at growth rates. GDP declined almost 5% in the recession, but then started growing at a glacial pace, averaging 2.4% since the trough.  We seem stuck in this slow growth trap.


If you distrust trend lines, you are wise. But this one reflects a solid historical pattern. Here is real GDP and the 1965-2007 trend through postwar history.

You can see that the economy has quite reliably returned to the trend line after recessions.The 1950s had a steeper trend, but there too the small recessions were followed by catchup growth.

Here is what the recovery is supposed to look like (Again, idea stolen from John Taylor, except I'm using trends rather than "potential GDP'' which I distrust.) 

To be fair, I fit the trend through 1980, so I would not use ex-post information. You see that after the severe 1980 recession at the even more severe 1982 recession, the economy recovered to trend, by posting a few years of 6% growth.

The tragedy is poorly expressed in growth rates. By 1987, the economy was back on the prior trend line. We are now 14.5% below the trendline, and each year that goes by like this we lose another half a percent. The average person in the economy is producing 14.5% less, and earning 14.5% less, than if we had followed the path following the 1982 recession.

That's a lot -- and a lot more than the litany of quarterly growth rates suggest.

I used trends, rather than the CBO potential output. If you read how they make it, you're likely to do that too. But here is the same graph contrasting my trend and the CBO's potential

This is tragic. The CBO is giving up on us. The CBO potential, which goes towards a 2.35% long run growth rate, says that what we are seeing now is the new normal. All we can hope for is a modest recovery, and then anemic, sclerotic growth forever after that. The difference between 2.3% and 3.0% adds up fast as the years go by. (And the CBO has been bending the trend line down steadily as the recession goes on. Back in 2005, it's "potential" looked like my "trend." They didn't see a permanent downward shift in level or reduction in growth rates. Look for "potential" to keep declining.)

Well, perhaps the CBO is doing its job as forecasters, saying "here is what will happen if you continue down the present policy path," not "here is where the economy would be if you adopted growth-oriented policies."

What about employment? I find employment more significant than unemployment. Unemployment means job search. It means people answer a survey saying they don't have a job, and are actively searching for a job. It does not count all the people who gave up, or went on disability (effectively ending their careers), early retirement, or are just living in Mom's basement and playing video games. (I don't mean to make light of it. That may be the most tragic, as the chance to accumulate skills is lost.)

Here's a good summary measure, the ratio of employed people to the population

This is really tragic. Employment declined by about 7 million people, from 63% of the population to about 58%. And it has stayed there ever since. The "job gains" you hear about in the news are just barely keeping up with population. As we are about 14% below trend and slowly losing ground, we are 7 million jobs short and sitting there too.

The link between employment and output is productivity. To keep the numbers simple here, I made plots of output per worker. Output per hour, and corrections for demographics and capital use are better, but this is simpler and works about as well. Here is a graph of productivity.

I crammed a lot of information in this graph. The first thing to notice is the behavior in the recession and now. There was a dip in productivity -- output fell more than the number of workers fell. But it has since recovered.

In the short run, capital doesn't change much, so as a rough guide you make more output when you hire more workers (or increase hours) and vice versa. So, GDP = Productivity x workers. To get more workers, we need to make a lot more GDP. The lackluster GDP growth is the other side of the terrible employment coin.

There's more in the graph. In the long run, rising productivity is behind everything good in the economy. It's what gives more income per capita. Rising productivity is the only hope for paying for entitlements and getting out of our deficit trap. It's the main hope for long-run GDP growth, after the empolyment-population ratio reverts to where it should be. Rising productivity comes from new ideas, new companies, new ways of doing business. It isn't all pleasant. Lots of incumbents lose out. Rising productivity is the core of a "growth" agenda as economists understand the word. 

You see in the graph that something terrible happened in the 1970s. Productivity, which was behind the large postwar boom, slowed down to a glacial 1% per year. 1982 marked a break in that as well. Productivity  started growing 1.69% per year, producing the boom of the late 1980s and 1990s, and incidentally producing large Federal surpluses.

OK, but the far right of the graph doesn't look so good does it. Here it is, blown up, with a 2003-today trend marked in as well.

This is an economists' horror movie. Yes, productivity did rebound. But it seems to be growing slowly as well.

The trends are an economists' horror movie. Real GDP seems not to be recovering at all -- no period of swift growth to go back to a trend. We seem stuck at 2.4% growth forever. The CBO is giving up on us too. Employment will not recover as a fraction of population until the economy recovers. We seem stuck at low employment forever. And now we seem headed to a 1970s productivity slowdown as well.

I don't view this as contentious, outside of Presidential politics. Paul Krugman thinks the economy is pretty awful too.

What to do? If only it were so simple as to have the Fed print up another two trillion dollars, or have the Treasury borrow another $5 trillion and blow it on stimulus boondoggles. We're stuck in sclerotic growth, and to everyone but a few die-hard extremists, that means growth-oriented policies are the only way out. 


Disclaimer. Yes, I know there are better ways to measure all this, especially productivity. This is an attempt to paint the basic picture using the simplest numbers. The message is, look at the levels and look at the trends. If you do that with better data, you will have gotten the message.

Data are from the St. Louis Fed's wonderful Fred database, series GDPC96, GDPPOT,  EMRATIO.

Who is for growth?

This weekend, a prominent columnist delivered some brilliant advice to a presidential candidate:

...make America the launching pad where everyone everywhere should want to come to launch their own moon shot, their own start-up, their own social movement. We can’t stimulate or tax-cut our way to growth. We have to invent our way there....

...we should aspire to be the world’s best launching pad because our work force is so productive; our markets the freest and most trusted; our infrastructure and Internet bandwidth the most advanced; our openness to foreign talent second to none; our funding for basic research the most generous; our rule of law, patent protection and investment-friendly tax code the envy of the world; our education system unrivaled; our currency and interest rates the most stable; our environment the most pristine; our health care system the most efficient; and our energy supplies the most secure, clean and cost-effective.

No, we are not all those things today...

Ok, quiz time. Is this

1. Some zany free-marketer pushing the Romney campaign to give some teeth to its "pro-growth" rhetoric?
2.  Advice to Ron Paul on a speech to rouse the Republican convention?
3. Thomas Friedman, New York Times columnist extraordinaire, in its Sunday pages advising the Obama campaign?

 Amazingly, C. The preamble was

Is there an integrated set of policies, and a narrative, that could animate, inspire and tie together an Obama second term? I think there is.... Obama should aspire to make America the launching pad..

Which gives me hope. Friedman is obviously much better connected than I. If he thinks there is even a ghost of a chance that the Obama campaign would adopt such a strategy, or that the administration would follow anything vaguely like this policy, that is tremendously good news. I thought these sorts of positions, while  middle-of-the-road growth economics, were, in the political sphere, too wildly free-market to hope for from the Romney campaign.

Think of what they mean.

• "We can’t stimulate our way to growth" is a remarkable admission for anyone in the New York Times orbit. Ok, it included "or tax cut," but an "investment-friendly tax code" has to mean low marginal rates on investment, which means low marginal rates on investment income. No way around it, lower marginal rates, broaden the base.
• "Our currency and interest rates the most stable" means likewise abandoning hope that endless rounds of Fed "stimulus" or devaluation as the key to success. Both statements are a repudiation of discretionary shoot-from-the-hip macroeconomic policy.
• A "productive" work force is not composed of protected unions and government workers, on federal boondoggle contracts.  
• "Openness to foreign talent" means we have to let people in. 
• "Rule of law" means that health, energy and financial regulation cannot be run by powerful regulators and their crony-capitalist protected industries.
• All of Friedman's startups succeed by undercutting and putting out of business old ossified but politically well connected companies, yes creating net new jobs but destroying a lot of old ones in the process. 
• If you've been reading this blog at all, you know  the likelihood that the current health care law and expansion of medicare will deliver anything like "efficiency."

These are radical views indeed. Congratulations to Friedman for stating them, and I hope his friends at the campaign are listening. A Nixon-to-China moment would certainly be refreshing.

(OK, but the moon shot analogy is just weird. What does spending about 3 percent of GDP to send two guys to the moon have to do with unleashing the innovation of thousands of new entrepreneurs? )